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Abstract 
This thesis provides the first evidence showing that the quality of fund 
stewardship matters to fund style drift. Based on 464 open-ended U.S. equity 
funds from 2007 to 2011, we find a negative association between overall 
stewardship and the holding-based measure of style consistency and style 
dispersion in the size dimension. In comparison, stewardship component 
measures, including fees, regulatory history, manager compensation, manager 
ownership, board quality, and corporate culture are more significant in explaining 
the style drift in size, value-growth, or overall dimension. We find that managerial 
compensation and ownership have opposing effects on style drift and should 
therefore be treated separately in tests of fund stewardship.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Style drift refers to a situation where a mutual fund deviates from its stated 
investment style or objective and shifts towards another investment style.1 Since Sharpe 
(1988) introduced a technique to analyze fund managers’ actual style using fund return 
series as a substitute for limited data on actual portfolio holdings, style drift has been 
discovered repeatedly in a number of mutual funds.2 This finding raises concerns among 
investor advocacy groups and financial planning professionals since style drift is thought 
to bring great perils to fundholders. In fact, those groups and associations3 petitioned the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to require mutual funds to disclose complete 
portfolio holdings more frequently with the aim of exposing any style drift.4  
                                                 
 
1  Style drift is also known in literature as style shift, style volatility, style switching, style gaming, style 
misclassification, style inconsistency, and risk-shifting activity. Style is commonly used by investment consultants to 
delineate different investment products such as size and value-growth. Fund style describes stock holding 
characteristics of the fund and has become important information for investors in selecting a fund (Del Guercio and 
Tkac, 2003). 
2 For example of funds that exhibited style drift, see “Franklin Mutual stays strictly within its value mandate as some peers 
stray”  in CNNMoney (20 August 1999). 
3 Among those groups and associations were International Brotherhood of Teamsters, American Federation of 
Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, National Association of Investors Corporation, Consumer 
Federation of America, Financial Planning Association, and Fund Democracy, LLC. 
4 See Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies 
(2004) adopted by SEC. 
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Even after the SEC enacted quarterly portfolio disclosure requirement in 2004, style 
drift still plagues the industry. SPIVA scorecard5 shows that almost half of U.S. equity 
funds exhibited investment style drift over the period from 2005 to 2009 (S&P Dow 
Jones Indices, 2010). To tackle this issue, the SEC reorganized its enforcement division in 
2010 to increase scrutiny of the industry, with containing style drift being one of their 
priorities 6 (Rothstein, Kass & Company, 2011). In 2012, the SEC brought litigations 
premised on style drift allegation against a number of fund management companies, 
including Top Fund Management and Solaris Management. Top Fund Management, for 
example, was found to have failed to follow the fund investment objectives, and as a 
sanction, the SEC barred its manager from working with any registered investment 
company (SEC, 2012). 
Style drift in mutual funds has also attracted much academic interest, with evidence 
that fund managers straying from their declared investment style documented in several 
studies (e.g., Brown, Harlow and Zhang, 2012; Wermers, 2012). Researchers argue that 
the motivation behind style drift is driven by fund managers’ desire to chase short-term 
outperformance over their rivals (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996) and to attract new 
asset flows and earn greater income for themselves (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). While 
                                                 
 
5 Standard & Poor’s Indices Versus Active (SPIVA) scorecard is designed to provide objective comparison of funds’ 
performance versus their appropriate style indices. This scorecard also measures style consistency for each style 
across different time horizons (Standard & Poor's Financial Services, 2013).  
6 SEC deems it a fraud if firms and managers engage in misrepresentations to investors about critical attributes 
including performance, assets, liquidity, investment strategy, valuation procedures, and conflicts of interest (SEC, 
2011). 
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the impact of style drift on fund returns is still unresolved in the literature,7 its effect on 
fund risk is certain. Because the portfolio of the drifting fund is weighted with assets 
belonging to other styles, the portfolio is exposed to inappropriate type of risk resulting 
in an unexpected risk/return tradeoff for the fundholders. As a consequence, style drift 
brings about an expected utility loss to the fundholders (Tkac, 2004), and potentially 
results in a real economic loss in extreme market condition. 8 For instance, when over a 
quarter of Fidelity Magellan’s (large-cap fund) assets were shifted from growth stocks to 
bonds and cash in early 1996 (bullish market), its fundholders’ returns underperformed 
its benchmark by over 10% for the year. Another notorious example is Legg Mason 
Value Trust (value fund) which produced a staggering loss of 23.7% per year from 2006 
to 2008 (bearish market) due to the significant portion of high-tech (growth) stocks in its 
portfolio. 
In the above cases, fundholders might presume that their capital had been invested 
in accordance with fund declared style, and as a result, were prepared to bear (or 
supposedly diversified away) only the risk associated with their preferred style. When 
fund managers act in their own interests and deviate from the mandated style, 
fundholders bear the unexpected risk introduced by managers into the portfolio. In sum, 
                                                 
 
7 Wermers (2012) finds that actively drifted funds outperform their counterparts, which is on the contrary to Brown, 
Harlow, and Zhang (2012) who find style consistency is positively related to future performance. 
8 To be deemed a fraud by SEC, style drift does not need to have resulted in realized underperformance. In fact, any 
performance that appears inconsistent with a fund’s investment strategy forms a basis for further scrutiny by SEC 
(2011). 
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fund managers who drift from the stated investment style pursue their own benefit to the 
detriment of fundholders – this, in essence, is an agency problem in mutual funds. 
Fundholders want to own a well-diversified portfolio, which will help to reduce 
their risk and provide a more consistent rate of return through all kinds of market cycles. 
To achieve this outcome, they will need to combine funds with less than perfectly 
correlated investment styles.9 This can only be achieved if the fund manager maintains an 
investment strategy in line with the fund’s mandated style. If the fund style drifts, say 
from small cap to large cap, fundholders may unexpectedly find themselves with an 
under-allocation to small-cap stocks and an excess of large-cap stocks, thus violating their 
aim of maintaining a well diversified portfolio. Further, fund performance evaluation is 
normally based on style so that if fund managers were to drift, measurement of the 
performance of the fund will be inaccurate. There is also evidence showing that fund 
managers who stick to their style tend to be better performers than those that drift 
(Brown, Harlow and Zhang, 2012; Huang, Sialm and Zhang, 2011). 
The Securities Act (1933) made mutual fund companies legally responsible for the 
reliability of information disclosed in their prospectus, including information on fund 
investment style. It is common to see equity funds indicate the investment style in their 
                                                 
 
9 Although mutual fund industry offers a wide selection of equity funds to meet almost any particular investor 
preferences, only a small number of fund investors hold a single fund and directly delegate management of their 
fund to a single fund manager. Investment Company Institute [ICI] (2012) finds that mutual-fund owning 
households own 4 mutual funds on average, and 80% of them purchase the funds through advisers. Investors obtain 
financial advice from professional financial advisers to establish appropriate asset allocation, select suitable mutual 
funds, facilitate fund purchasing, as well as to review and adjust the their fund portfolio periodically (ICI, 2007). 
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name and/or state it explicitly as the investment strategy in their prospectus. To protect 
fundholders from misleading fund names, mutual fund companies that have a specific 
style stated in their name are required by law to invest at least 80% of their assets 
according to that stated style (Investment Company Names, 2001). For example, XYZ 
Large Cap Growth Equity Fund is required to invest at least 80% of its assets in large cap 
growth stocks and the remainder elsewhere. 
The Investment Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act do not explicitly 
require fund managers (and the board) to control and monitor the fund investment style. 
However, both laws reinforce the fiduciary duties of fund managers and the board to act 
in the best interest of their fundholders.10 In the same way, the SEC (as cited in North 
American Securities Administrators Association, n.d.) affirms that one of the fund 
manager’s fiduciary duties is to make reasonable investment decisions based on several 
factors including the fundholder’s investment objectives. Likewise, the Independent 
Director Council (IDC, n.d.) views an oversight duty of the fund board is to monitor 
various fund matters including monitoring performance and risk that are closely related 
to the fund investment style.  
                                                 
 
10 For example, Russell Investments states that “Many changes can occur in funds, and investors aren't always aware of 
them. A manager may leave a firm, or a manager might alter their investment style unexpectedly.  For these reasons, 
Russell continuously monitors its managers to make sure they stick to their assignment, replacing them if necessary. 
This way, your investment stays on track with your goal.” 
(http://www.russell.com/ca/education_centre/investment_approach/multi_manager/default.asp) 
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Despite these efforts, managers have been found to change their mandated strategy 
in the hope of recovering from past losses or go with the flow and adopt whichever style 
that was successful recently (Chan, Chen and Lakonishok, 2002). Kim, Shukla and Tomas 
(2000) find only 46% of a sample of 1,043 funds had investment attributes that are 
consistent with the fund’s stated objectives. 11 Over the three-year period covered by the 
study, 57% of surviving funds changed their investment style at some point, with only 
27% held their investment attributes constant. Similar findings are documented by Frijns, 
Gilbert, and Zwinkels (2012).  
Style drift is thus perennial as it shares the same root problem (i.e., agency conflicts 
between fund managers and fundholders) as major scandals that have repeatedly 
occurred in the mutual funds industry. 12  In the past, these conflicts have severely 
betrayed investors’ trust in the mutual fund industry. To rebuild investors’ confidence in 
the industry, regulatory authorities and mutual fund companies have put their foot 
forward and strive for better governance. 
                                                 
 
11 It is possible for equity funds to drift away from the stated style for several reasons. First, the drift may arise from 
the fund manager actively seeking investment opportunities outside the fund’s stated style. This type of drift can 
occur without violating the Investment Company Names Act as long as the percentage of the investment of the 
fund’s asset in other investment styles is less than one-fifth. Second, style drift can occur passively or naturally. For 
example, a small cap fund which has stock holdings growing into mid-cap size stocks will experience a passive style 
drift if the manager of the fund does nothing to rebalance its stock holdings. One possible reason for this is that the 
fund manager may hesitate to sell a stock which has outgrown the stated style, perhaps because the stock has been 
performing well or there is not enough investment opportunity in the initial fund style to substitute the grown stock. 
Fund managers can let this drift occur without violating the Securities Act if they put a special clause such as 
“market value at the time of purchase” in their prospectus. 
12 The first major abuse, which was widely perpetrated in the 1920s and 1930s, involved self-dealing transactions and 
excessive fees. The greatest scandal in the U.S. mutual fund history occurred in 2003-2004 and it involved some of 
the largest mutual funds allowing particular fundholders to perform market timing or late trading strategies.  
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At the industry level, the U.S. authorities undertook several financial reforms to 
reduce agency problems in the mutual fund industry and to provide greater investor 
protection. Following the frauds in the 1930s, the Congress decided to regulate the 
mutual fund industry by enacting the Investment Company Act of 1940. The focus of the 
Act was on the fiduciary duty of fund management companies and it included provisions 
for mutual fund governance such as board structure and disclosure. The well-known fund 
management scandal in the 1960s 13 resulted in amendments to the Act through the 
imposition of stricter standards of fiduciary duties on fund managers and the board of 
directors. In response to the 2003-2004 market timing and late trading scandals, the SEC 
enacted a number of new rules to foster better stewardship in the mutual fund industry 
through higher standards of fund governance as well as enhanced disclosure so as to 
ensure that fund managers and the board fulfill their responsibilities to meet the fund’s 
investment objectives. 
Regulation-imposed governance at the industry level sets forth the minimum 
standard for all fund companies in the industry. At the fund level, each mutual fund may 
adopt a standard (high or low) of governance to suit its specific situation and needs. For 
example, although the SEC requires a simple majority of independent directors, some 
mutual funds adopt a supermajority (two-thirds or more) of such directors coupled with 
                                                 
 
13 The scandal in the 1960s involved fund management favoritism toward one big off-shore fundholder who 
provided a significant source of income to them and harmed many fundholders. 
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an independent board chair in order to attain better stewardship and thus better serve 
their fundholders. Therefore, even with the regulatory standards of fund governance, 
there are varying degrees of stewardship quality among mutual funds. 
Benefiting from higher standards of governance, a fund with better stewardship 
should have better ability to curb agency problems and has lesser agency conflicts than 
their counterparts with lower stewardship. Since style drift roots in agency conflicts, we 
argue that the quality of fund stewardship matters to the level of style drift. 
1.2 Research Aims and Motivations  
Fund governance and stewardship has attracted much attention from independent 
research companies, investors, and academia. Independent research companies such as 
Morningstar, for example, have been assessing and awarding grades on fund stewardship 
since 2004. Investors too consider the quality of fund stewardship important in making 
their fund selection decision (Lai, Tiwari, and Zhang, 2010). This comes as no surprise 
since fund survivability and performance have been found to be associated with the 
quality of fund stewardship (Morningstar, 2011).  
The academic literature has also seen considerable growth in fund governance 
research. Most study the relationship between fund governance and a specific fund 
characteristic such as fund fees, fund performance, fund flows, and fund managers’ 
actions. This thesis adds to this line of study by examining the relationship between fund 
9 
 
stewardship and style (or strategy) drift. It argues that the quality of fund stewardship has 
an influence on the intensity of style monitoring and ultimately the level of fund holdings 
dispersion and style drift. We address the following key questions: (i) Does the quality of 
fund stewardship matter to the level of fund style drift and style dispersion? (ii) Which 
fund stewardship component(s) explains fund style drift and style dispersion? and (iii) 
Which dimension of style drift and style dispersion (i.e., size or value-growth, or both) is 
most strongly linked to fund stewardship? 
1.3 Summary of Results and Contributions 
We use Morningstar Stewardship Grades (originally called Fiduciary Grades) to 
measure the quality of fund stewardship, and Morningstar Style Dispersion Metric to 
evaluate fund style dispersion. Fund style drift is measured using both returns-based and 
holding-based style analysis approach.  
Based on a sample of 464 US equity funds, we find limited evidence of an inverse 
association between overall fund stewardship and various measures of style consistency 
and dispersion; the holding-based measure of drift and fund holdings dispersion in the 
size dimension are exceptions to this. However, the results are much stronger for 
stewardship component measures. In most specifications, we find fund fees; whether 
there have been any regulatory issues at the fund company in recent years; managerial 
incentives and its subcomponents (manager compensation and manager ownership) are 
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all strongly related to style drift. Board quality is significant in explaining the holding-
based style consistency in the size dimension and style dispersion in all dimensions. There 
is also evidence that corporate culture is significant in explaining style dispersion in the 
size dimension. In sum, we provide convincing evidence that better stewardship in the 
form of higher manager compensation and better board quality can ensure that fund 
managers and fund boards perform their fiduciary duties, particularly in relation to 
increased monitoring of the fund investment style that ultimately will result in lower style 
drift.  
Apart from providing the first evidence on the relationship between the quality of 
fund stewardship and the level of fund style drift and dispersion, our study also 
contributes to the research methods employed in this line of investigation. By utilizing 
the numeric scores on individual components of fund stewardship instead of ordinal 
stewardship grades provided by Morningstar, we are able to compute a finer stewardship 
measure. Our contribution also lies in the decomposition of the fund manager incentives 
score into its sub-components: manager compensation and manager ownership. Our 
results show that these sub-components have opposite impacts on fund style drift, which 
would otherwise have been left unidentified if the component grade or score were used 
instead. Further, in using a number of style drift measures, we are able to discover the 
association between fund stewardship and various ways of style monitoring. Finally, we 
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are the first to decompose fund style drift into two dimensions – size drift and value-
growth drift – as well as to use fund style dispersion metrics that enable us to analyze 
fund style monitoring in terms of stock holdings dispersion. 
1.4 Chapter Layout 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and 
Chapter 3 presents the testable hypotheses on how high stewardship quality can curb 
style drift.  Chapter 4 describes the data including the sources in the study. Empirical 
results are discussed in Chapter 5, and a summary and conclusions are provided in 
Chapter 6.  
12 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the empirical literature on investment style drift 
and mutual fund governance. Section 2.2 briefly discusses agency conflicts and fund 
managers’ risk taking. Section 2.3 reviews the extant literature on investment style drift, 
followed by Section 2.3 which discusses studies on mutual fund governance. Section 2.4 
summarizes. 
2.2 Agency Conflicts and Risk Taking by Fund Managers 
The relationship between investors (fundholders) and managers in mutual funds 
can be described as a relationship between a principal (investors) and an agent (fund 
manager). Agency problem arises when these interests are misaligned. While both 
fundholders and managers desire and benefit from fund outperformance, they are 
motivated by different underlying interests (Ferris and Yan, 2007a; Frankel, 2006; 
Mahoney, 2004) that may conflict in the way the performance is achieved (Tkac, 2004). 
Fundholders desire superior, long-term, ‘true’, and ‘comparable’ risk-adjusted 
13 
 
performance. 14  Thus, they expect that the performance is achieved by consistently 
investing in asset classes mandated by the fund’s investment objective. In contrast, fund 
managers crave for short-term (less than one-year period) outperformance over their 
rivals (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996) since it will make the fund more attractive, 
thereby increasing investment inflows and ultimately growing the fund manager’s fee-
based income (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). 
These conflicts are more severe when fund managers’ actual investment decisions 
are not observable by fundholders. The lack of transparency allows fund managers to 
chase short-term performance through higher risk taking (Starks, 1987), which can be 
achieved by deliberately shifting/tilting their portfolio risk during the interim between 
fund performance reports (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 
1997). As the actual portfolio risk is understated by the implied risk of the fund’s 
investment objective and benchmark, the fund’s risk-adjusted performance appears 
deceptively higher than its peers (Kim, Shukla, and Tomas, 2000). For this reason, fund 
managers who embark on risk shifting tend to mislead investors by presenting 
information that overstates fund performance (DiBartolomeo and Witkowski, 1997). 
                                                 
 
14 Two well-known mutual fund rating systems (i.e. Morningstar Star Ratings and Lipper Leaders Rating) that are 
used widely as investment guide by investors and fund advisors use long-term risk-adjusted performance as the main 
basis for assigning ratings. Their performance evaluations are: based on actual holdings style category (as opposed to 
stated style) to facilitate valid comparison and ranking; and carried out over 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year period (if 
applicable) to reward fund with strong and consistent performance. 
14 
 
2.3 Style Drift 
Fund managers of actively managed funds with a specific investment style are 
supposedly more constrained in their risk taking given that fund style delineates fund risk 
characteristics. For that reason, investors who want to invest in a particular style(s) would 
put their capital in the fund(s) with that stated investment style (Barberis and Shleifer, 
2003; Del Guercio and Tkac, 2003). Such funds have become very popular among fund 
investors together with the rapid increase of number of funds with specific investment 
style since the mid 1990s.15  
With the high popularity of style investing, some trendy managers apparently 
labeled their new/existing funds with a specific style to exploit this opportunity. In fact, 
research finds a high number of fund managers who change the name of their existing 
fund in order to look like the current ‘hot’ or ‘glamour’ investment style. For example, 
Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005) observe that a 296 equity funds changed their name to a 
“style name” (i.e., value, growth, small, or large) over the period from April 1994 to July 
2001. They find that funds earn a positive abnormal inflow when they change their name 
to reflect the current hot style despite the fact that their previous performance was quite 
average and there were no actual changes in their portfolio holdings to match the new 
name. Interestingly, flows to those funds are also found to increase steadily over the years 
                                                 
 
15 In 2001, SEC estimated that 83% of funds stated their investment focuses and risks (including styles) in their 
names (Investment Company Names, 2001). 
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after the name change. Their findings provide evidence that fund investors’ investment 
decisions can be irrationally influenced by aesthetic effects such as fund declared/stated 
style, not the actual investment style. 
Brown and Goetzmann (1997) find over the period from 1976 to 1992, there were 
237 cases in which equity funds switched their fund objective and experienced an average 
net gain of 9.8% in ex-post performance. These cases are consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence that mutual funds can improve their relative performance measures by 
intentionally misclassifying themselves on their style. Their findings are supported by 
DiBartolomeo and Witkowski (1997) who report about 40% of the funds they studied 
delivered returns that are more typical of another style than their own. Using the return 
difference of the fund’s declared and actual styles, they estimate that aggregate wealth 
overstated by style misclassification is nearly $4 billion. 
2.4 Mutual Fund Governance 
To help us address whether fund stewardship matters to the level of fund style drift, 
we review the empirical literature on mutual fund governance to gauge how effective 
governance mechanisms are in curbing agency conflicts in mutual funds. Two distinct 
strands of the research are identified. The first strand looks at the role of fund 
governance in aligning the interests of fund managers with those of fundholders. The 
second strand examines the effect of various governance mechanisms on mutual fund 
16 
 
outcomes using a set of governance measures provided by independent research 
companies such as Morningstar. 
There is a large volume of research describing the role of fund governance in 
aligning the interests of fund managers and the board with those of fundholders. These 
studies attempt to find a relationship between particular governance practices and specific 
fund characteristics that matter to fundholders such as fund fees, fund performance, and 
various types of fund manager’s actions (e.g., managerial herding, proxy voting, and 
tournament effect). Several areas of fund governance practices have been studied, 
including the board structure, compensation structure, director ownership, and fund 
manager ownership. 
The role of independent directors or the chairman in defending the interests of 
fundholders is investigated in a number of studies. Tufano and Sevick (1997) examine the 
relationship between board structure and fund fees for the 50 largest fund management 
companies in 1992. They find that the fees charged to fundholders are lower when fund 
boards are smaller and have a higher proportion of independent directors. They also find 
funds with higher director compensation tend to approve higher fees. 
Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003) study board structure and director 
independence of 476 closed-end funds offered by 105 fund management companies. 
They report that funds with relatively low expense ratios have a smaller board, a higher 
17 
 
proportion of independent directors, and relatively lower director compensation. Their 
results suggest that board structure and director independence are related to fundholders’ 
interest, and that the board is an effective watchdog. Their findings are consistent with 
Tufano and Sevick (1997). 
Ferris and Yan (2007b) use a sample of 6,228 mutual funds in 2002 to address 
whether board and chair independence are related to the likelihood of a fund scandal. 
Their series of regression analysis shows no such relationship, and that neither board nor 
chair independence is related to fund fees and portfolio turnover. Their results show that 
director compensation is inversely related to fund governance quality, measured by fees 
and the likelihood of being implicated in a fund scandal. 
Meschke (2007) assesses how board independence and director incentives relate to 
fund expenses, performance, and regulatory compliance. Using a sample of 400 randomly 
selected mutual funds from 1995 to 2004, he finds funds that charge lower fees are 
overseen by an independent chair. Consistent with previous studies (Del Guercio, Dann 
and Partch, 2003; Ferris and Yan, 2007b; Tufano and Sevick, 1997), his findings show 
that funds that pay higher director compensation charge higher fees. However, there is 
no evidence of a positive relationship between board or chair independence and fund 
performance. Only director compensation is related to fund performance. 
18 
 
Contrary to anecdotal evidence, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2008) find a substantial 
number of directors who own shares in the fund they oversee. Further, their 
shareholding is greater in funds where their monitoring effort generates greater value to 
fundholders, such as in actively managed funds and equity funds. Their study provides 
new evidence of the importance of the role of director ownership in interest alignment, 
supporting Meschke (2007) who finds funds with a higher director ownership charge 
lower fees and exhibit better performance. 
Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007) report half of all managers have ownership in 
their funds, and that the risk-adjusted performance is positively related to their 
percentage ownership. Evans (2008) reports the same. These results therefore suggest 
that director ownership is a powerful mechanism in aligning incentives between the 
fund’s board and fundholders. 
More recent studies examine the effect of various fund governance mechanisms on 
mutual fund outcomes using a set of governance measures provided by independent 
research companies such as Morningstar. Morningstar evaluates selected U.S. mutual 
funds and assigns both overall and component grades for each fund. Morningstar 
Stewardship (MS) Grades, which are frequently used in academic studies, are regularly 
updated and accessible in a database format. 
19 
 
Huang and Chen (2011) use MS Grades to examine the relationship between 
mutual fund performance and governance effectiveness. To get numerical measures of 
stewardship component, they convert the letter (ordinal) stewardship grade with A=5, 
B=4, and so on. They find managers’ incentives have a strong relationship with fund 
returns, and corporate culture is significantly related to the fund’s Sharpe Ratio. They also 
report that these two components and board quality reduce the fund’s turnover ratio. 
The role of fund governance in monitoring managerial herding is studied by 
Casavecchia and Tooman (2011). Using stewardship component grades for funds 
provided by Morningstar, they show that stronger managerial incentive schemes provide 
a deterrent against managerial herding strategies. 
Lai, Tiwari and Zhang (2010) investigate the impact of board quality on fund flows, 
fund performance, and the likelihood of changes in the investment strategy. For this 
purpose, they use Morningstar Stewardship Grade as the basis for fund board 
classification, where boards are classified into “good board” if they receive good or 
excellent grade from Morningstar, and “bad board” otherwise. They find 
underperformed funds with a bad board experience significantly lower fund flows 
compared to those with a good board. This suggests that board quality contains 
information valuable to investors. They also find good performance persists in funds 
with high quality boards, while poor performance persists in funds with bad quality 
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boards. Following poor performance, funds with a bad board are more likely to change 
strategy. 
Unlike previous studies which focus on a particular governance practice, Chou, Ng 
and Wang (2011) investigate whether fund governance as a whole affects the investment 
decisions and monitoring role of mutual funds. Based on sample of 1,137 funds, they 
find funds with good governance, as measured by Morningstar Stewardship Grades, tilt 
their portfolios toward better governed companies and tend to vote against 
management’s proposals which are not in the best interest of fundholders. They conclude 
that fund governance mechanisms play an important monitoring role, with better 
governed funds being better at carrying out their fiduciary duties and acting in the 
interests of their fundholders. 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In summary, the extant literature shows governance mechanisms can help in 
alleviating agency conflicts in mutual funds. To the best of our knowledge, no study has 
examined whether and how effective fund governance is in ensuring compliance to the 
mandated investment style. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by developing three main hypotheses 
on the relationship between fund stewardship and style drift. More specifically, we 
investigate four fund governance mechanisms: (i) corporate culture; (ii) board quality; (iii) 
manager compensation; and (iv) manager ownership. Two further fund characteristics, 
which indicate the outcome of fund stewardship (i.e., regulatory history and fund fees) 
are also examined. The hypotheses are proposed in Section 3.2 while Section 3.3 
concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Testable Hypotheses 
A mutual fund is a professionally managed company that pools funds from many 
fundholders for the purpose of investing in various securities. Like listed companies, a 
mutual fund has a board of directors which oversees the management of the fund on 
behalf of the fundholders. Since mutual funds typically have no employees, mutual fund 
companies hire external fund management companies 16  to perform day-to-day 
                                                 
 
16 Fund management companies are also known as fund manager, portfolio manager, fund adviser, or fund sponsor. 
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management and operations of the funds. As a result, there is an agency relationship 
between fundholders (the principal) and fund managers (the agent), which potentially 
creates an agency conflict (Ferris and Yan, 2007a; Frankel, 2006; Mahoney, 2004). 
Agency conflict occurs when the fund manager has differing and conflicting 
interests to those of the fundholders. Tkac (2004) and SEC Office of Economic Analysis 
(2006) list three sources of this conflict: (i) differences in financial incentives of the adviser 
and the fund; (ii) differences in risk tolerance of the adviser and the fundholder; and (iii) 
cross-subsidization, where fund managers favor one fund class (clientele) over another. 
Agency conflict is unfavourable for fundholders since it provides incentives for fund 
managers to pursue their own interests to the detriment of fundholders. Risk-shifting, for 
example, is a result of agency conflicts due to differences in financial incentives and risk 
tolerance (Tkac, 2004). These differences provide incentives for fund managers to alter 
the portfolio risk away from fundholders’ preferences, resulting in style drift. 
In the absence of costless information about the fund manager’s investment 
decisions, fundholders have no other options but to entrust fund managers and the fund 
board to control and monitor the fund’s actual investment style as part of their fiduciary 
duties. Hence, the extent of control and monitoring of the fund’s investment style 
depends on the attainment of those fiduciary duties by the fund managers and board. 
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Funds that serve the primary interests of fundholders as their sole responsibility are 
regarded as stewardship funds (Haslem, 2009).17 To attain good stewardship,18 mutual 
funds undertake various governance mechanisms whose purpose is to align the two 
parties’ interests so that agency costs in the fund can be minimized (Nelson, Wells, Perry 
and Hanson, 2004). The ultimate goal of fund governance is for the fund managers and 
the board to fulfill all their fiduciary duties (Radin and Stevenson, 2006), including 
monitoring fund investment style and compliance with regulation and fundholders’ 
investment mandate (Miller and Phillips, 1995; Spencer, 1997). Recent studies confirm 
that better governed funds are better at carrying out their fiduciary duties and acting in 
the interests of their fundholders (Chou, Ng and Wang, 2011).  
In view of this, we expect that the quality of fund stewardship has an influence on 
the intensity of style monitoring, and ultimately, the level of fund style drift.19 Specifically, 
we argue that funds with good stewardship are more effective in monitoring fund 
investment style, so that such funds are less likely to drift from their mandated style. 
Therefore, we predict the following hypothesis: 
H1: Funds with better stewardship exhibit less style drift. 
                                                 
 
17 Fund stewardship refers to the quality of fund’s governance practices that provide an indication of whether the 
interests of fund manager are aligned with those of the fundholders.  
18 Academics and mutual fund professionals develop several approaches to help investors identifying fund with 
good stewardship, for example, Haslem(2009)’s Five Dimensions Analysis, Morningstar(2011)’s Stewardship 
Grades, and Bogle(2009)’s Stewardship Quotient. 
19 The first dimension of stewardship analysis suggested by Haslem (2009) is risk/return performance. He asserts 
that funds should be well diversified as indicated by large R-square to the fund’s style benchmark index. Therefore, 
he implies that style consistency is a sign of funds with better stewardship. 
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The underlying theory of fund stewardship is agency theory, which views the 
misalignment in interests between shareholders and managers as being the root of the 
agency conflict in the firms (Jensen, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). With insignificant 
ownership stake in the firms, managers have little incentive to manage the firm 
effectively. Corporate governance mechanism offer one way to align these conflicting 
interests by means of ownership structure, manager compensation structure, and board 
structure, among others (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In this study, we examine several governance practices that can potentially 
contribute to better stewardship, and have been widely adopted by mutual funds and 
disclosed regularly to the public. These practices, which we extract from Morningstar,20 
are: (i) corporate culture; (ii) board quality; (iii) manager compensation; and (iv) 
managerial ownership. In the following, we discuss how each of these mechanisms 
influences the propensity for style drift. 
O’Reilly and Chatman (1996, p. 166) define corporate culture as “a set of norms 
and values that are widely shared and strongly held throughout the organization.” 
Corporate culture in mutual funds is shown in the fund’s focus, investment processes, 
expertise, interaction with investors, working environment, and offering quality. Just as 
corporate culture shapes the way firms conduct their business, funds’ corporate culture 
                                                 
 
20 Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion of the Morningstar database as well as the calibration of the various 
stewardship mechanisms we outline in the hypotheses. 
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also affects their performance (Sorensen, 2002). Gottesman and Morey (2012) assert that 
fund culture sets the tone for the entire operation of the fund. In fact, they find funds 
with better corporate culture have lower expense and turnover ratio. 
Among other things, there are two important attributes of funds that have a 
fundholder-focused culture, which are systematic investment processes and longer 
managerial tenure. These attributes are particularly important since they characterize the 
experience and stability of fund managers who run the fund. 21 Funds that frequently 
change their management team or have no systematic investment processes are more 
likely to experience inconsistencies in the execution of investment strategy. For example, 
Gallo and Lockwood (1999) find more than 65 percent of the equity funds in their 
sample experience an investment style drift after a change in management, indicating that 
new fund managers alter the fund’s corporate culture and risk profile. Since style drift 
exposes fundholders’ portfolio to undesired levels of style risk, they suggest that 
fundholders should monitor funds that experience a change in management. 
Corporate culture therefore contributes to investment style consistency. That is, 
funds with better corporate culture are more likely to be managed by fund managers who 
have experience in executing fund strategy and maintaining their investment style 
consistency. Better corporate culture further increases behavioural consistency in a firm 
                                                 
 
21 Experience and stability of portfolio managers are one of twelve standards in the Bogle(2009)’s Stewardship 
Quotient. 
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(Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992), thus enhancing the consistency in the fund’s investment 
process, and ultimately, the investment style.  We therefore predict that funds with better 
corporate culture exhibit less style drift. 
H1a: Funds with a better corporate culture exhibit less style drift. 
The second governance mechanism we examine is board quality.22 The board of 
directors plays an important role in enhancing fund stewardship by representing the 
interests of fundholders. One of directors’ oversight responsibilities23 is to monitor fund 
performance and fees. To fulfill this responsibility, “directors should look at a fund’s 
performance as a whole and over time, taking into consideration its investment 
objectives, strategies, and risks to evaluate whether the fund is meeting its stated 
objectives” (IDC, 2012). 
Considering the importance of the board of directors in protecting fundholders, the 
U.S. authorities undertook several financial reforms to promote the adoption of higher 
standards of board structure in the mutual fund industry. The most recent standards 
                                                 
 
22 Board quality is also referred in literature as board effectiveness. 
23  Independent Director Council (IDC, 2012) summarizes the fundamental oversight responsibilities of fund 
directors, comprising: oversight of fund performance and fees; oversight of distribution; general oversight 
responsibilities; and specific regulatory responsibilities. 
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enforced by the SEC are board independence24 and the disclosure of fund ownership by 
independent directors.25 
The role of independent fund board members in protecting the interests of 
fundholders is confirmed in a number of studies. Funds that charge lower fees have on 
average a more independent chair person (Meschke, 2007) and a larger fraction of 
independent directors (Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch, 2003; Tufano and Sevick, 1997).  
Research also confirms the importance of the role of director ownership in mutual 
funds.26 Meschke (2007) finds funds with higher director ownership charge lower fees as 
well as exhibiting better performance. His findings are supported by Cremers, Driessen, 
Maenhout and Weinbaum (2009) who report that funds with a lower director ownership 
significantly underperform. Furthermore, funds that demand greater directors’ 
monitoring effort (such as small funds, growth funds, active-managed funds, funds with a 
small number of institutional investors, and funds whose money flows are sensitive to 
performance) typically have higher director ownership (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2008). 
This suggests that director ownership can be used to provide incentives for directors to 
monitor the fund. 
                                                 
 
24 Board independence refers to the state in which a majority of a board of directors are not interested persons as 
defined by Investment Company Act of 1940 (e.g. significant business partners, and family members). 
25 Director ownership refers to fund share ownership of a director in the fund he or she oversees. 
26 Director ownership is part of insider ownership standard in the Bogle(2009)’s Stewardship Quotient. 
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We argue that better board quality, as indicated by board independence and the 
percentage director ownership in the fund, contributes to better investment style 
consistency. First, through substantial fund ownership, directors tie their own financial 
interests with those of fundholders as their own personal wealth is put at risk if the fund 
exhibits style drift. Thus, directors have greater incentives, over and above their call of 
fiduciary duties, to monitor managers (Bhagat, Carey and Elson, 1999; Mehran, 1995).  
Second, greater independence strengthens the role of the board as the watchdog for 
fundholders. Specifically, a more independent and thus stronger board is more able to 
prevent fund managers’ domination over the board 27  and to vigorously represent 
fundholders’ interests when evaluating fund managers’ action and plan. Further, stronger 
boards provide better protection to fundholders from dysfunctional behavior (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) such as style drift. Therefore, we predict that funds with better board 
quality can do a better job in monitoring and ensuring style consistency. 
H1b: Funds with better board quality exhibit less style drift. 
The third governance mechanism is the financial compensation structure received 
by managers of a mutual fund. Fund manager compensation consists typically of a 
mixture of salary (fixed compensation) and incentives (variable compensation); deferred 
                                                 
 
27 Interested directors have greater access to information about the fund that give them advantage over the 
independent directors in setting the board agenda as well as dominating the board meeting. 
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and non-deferred compensation; and cash and non-cash compensation. Further, 
managerial incentives may be based on assets under management and/or performance 
based bonus (pre- or after-tax performance bonus).28 
Managerial compensation structure, particularly incentives, has implications for the 
alignment of interests between fund managers and fundholders. For example, Massa and 
Patgiri (2009) show that fund managers whose payoffs are closely related to their 
performance (high incentives) deliver superior performance, suggesting that incentives 
affect unobserved actions of fund managers. Their findings show that the superior 
performance is not only explained by fund managers’ efforts but also their higher risk-
taking. In analyzing the relationship between managerial incentives and fund survivability 
using Cox’s hazard rate, they find an increase in incentives also leads to an increase in the 
hazard rate. Thus, funds with higher incentives (i.e., a higher proportion of performance-
related compensation in the managers’ total payoffs) have a lower probability of survival. 
The above study suggests that the managerial compensation structure may have a 
detrimental effect on fund stewardship as it induces fund managers to embark on risk-
shifting which ultimately leads to lower survivability. This adverse effect is more likely to 
occur if the financial incentives are measured based on performance over a short-term 
                                                 
 
28 In a study of 4,138 U.S. mutual funds from 669 fund management companies in 2009, Ma, Tang, and Gomez 
(2013) find that 98 percent of fund managers receive variable compensation, about three-quarters of managers 
receive bonus based on fund performance, and about 30 percent of managers have deferred compensation. 
30 
 
period. 29  It is because short-term performance incentives induce fund managers to 
frequently shift their portfolio risk (away from fundholders’ preferences), stretching for a 
risky short-term gain. For example, when the incentives are based on the fund’s year-end 
return rank relative to its peers, fund managers tend to change their fund risk profile 
during the year depending on the fund’s interim rank (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; 
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). This risk-shifting behavior exhibited by fund managers 
ultimately results in higher style volatility (Brown, Harlow and Zhang, 2012). Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
H1c: Funds whose managerial incentives are based on long-term fund performance 
exhibit less drift.  
The last governance mechanism studied is managerial ownership, which concerns 
the amount of capital invested by managers in the fund they manage. Information on 
managerial ownership is valuable to fundholders, and as such the SEC requires funds to 
disclose this info regularly in their Statement of Additional Information (SAI).30 
By owning a share of the fund, a fund manager aligns her interests with those of 
fundholders as both parties now share the same ownership experience. As a result, fund 
                                                 
 
29 Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2013) observe a significant variation in the performance evaluating periods. The longest is 
10-year and the shortest is one-quarter. 
30 Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) report almost half of fund managers have ownership in their funds. Evans 
(2008) reports that 51.5% equity fund managers have ownership over $500,000. 
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managers with a significant ownership in the fund are more likely to act in the best 
interest of fundholders, which is the essence of fund stewardship.31 
The literature shows that managerial ownership is a sound governance practice for 
aligning incentives between fund manager and fundholders. Evans (2008) finds 
managerial ownership is inversely related to fund turnover, suggesting a reduction in the 
agency cost of the type in Dow and Gorton (1997).32 She also reports that the percentage 
managerial ownership is positively related to style-adjusted performance. Additionally, 
managerial ownership can explain future fund performance, and contains desirable 
incentive alignment attributes for investors (Khorana, Servaes and Wedge, 2007). 
The percentage of managerial ownership shows the fund managers’ conviction in 
the fund investment strategies as well as in their ability to execute those strategies. This 
conviction is essential for fund strategy execution and investment style consistency 
monitoring. Therefore, we expect funds with higher managerial ownership exhibit less 
drift. 
H1d: Funds with higher managerial ownership exhibit less style drift. 
In addition to the above governance mechanisms, we also evaluate fund attributes 
which indicate the quality of fund stewardship in recent years, i.e., regulatory history and 
                                                 
 
31 Manager ownership is part of insider ownership standard in the Bogle(2009)’s Stewardship Quotient. 
32 Dow and Gorton (1997) argue that excessive trading results from an attempt by an uninformed/unskilled fund 
manager (agent) to appear to fundholders (principal) that they are informed/skilled and are not simply doing 
nothing, since fundholders cannot distinguish uninformed trading from the informed one. 
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fees. These measures are relevant to evaluate current stewardship as they demonstrate the 
actual outcome of fund stewardship. 
Regulatory history attests any regulatory issues that involve the mutual fund over 
the last seven years. Since regulatory issues are essentially breaches of fiduciary duties, 
mutual funds that have experienced regulatory issues of any kind are perceived as having 
an inadequate implementation of compliance control. For this reason, regulatory history 
not only reflects the fund’s ability to comply with regulation, but also reveals the quality 
of compliance control mechanism implemented by the fund (Davis, Payne and 
McMahan, 2007).  
Compliance to stated investment style is governed by Securities Act (1933) and 
Investment Company Names (2001). Mutual funds that do not have any regulatory 
problems are more likely to have an adequate control and monitoring mechanism in place 
to ensure that the fund’s actual investment complies with the regulatory requirements and 
meets its stated objectives. Therefore, we expect funds with better regulatory history have 
a more consistent investment style. We hypothesize the following: 
H2: Funds with better regulatory history exhibit less style drift. 
The second attribute is fund fees. Fees capture the effectiveness of governance in 
reducing agency problems in a fund. Unlike the first four governance mechanisms (tested 
in H1a to H1d), which measure the current quality of stewardship (the leading measure), 
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fees are the outcome of fund stewardship which measures the actual results of 
stewardship (the lagging measure). Fees are a good attribute to assess fund stewardship 
since they showcase the conflict between fund managers’ desire for higher income and 
fundholders’ concern for lower expenses. If a fund charges high fees, fund managers’ 
income is maximized, while fundholders’ total returns are adversely affected. Thus, fees 
charged by fund managers to fundholders are the prevailing outcome of the conflicts 
between them and indicate the effectiveness of governance mechanisms adopted by a 
fund in reducing those conflicts. Therefore, fees are an important measure used to assess 
fund stewardship.33 
The relationship between fund fees and style drift can be explained by the adapted 
Dow and Gorton (1997) model. 34 Fund managers who actively search for short-term 
trading opportunities35 and find those only in a style other than the mandated investment 
style will still execute trades to signal to their fundholders that they posses skill or private 
information, although such trades may actually increase the portfolio’s style risk.36 This 
action results from an inability of fundholders to distinguish an informed trade from an 
uninformed one. A consequence of frequent short-term trading is increased turnover, 
which in turn leads to higher fees. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
                                                 
 
33 To evaluate funds with good stewardship, Bogle(2009)’s Stewardship Quotient has three standards (out of twelve) 
related to fees (i.e., advertising, pays for shelf-space, and sales commissions). 
34 In original Dow and Gorton (1997) model there is no limitation on investment style. 
35 It refers to trading opportunities induced by incentives based on short-term performance. 
36 Style risk is measured using tracking error (in information ratio) or residual standard deviation (in appraisal ratio). 
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H3: Funds with lower total fees exhibit less style drift. 
3.3 Summary 
 In summary, we develop three main hypotheses on the relationship between style 
drift and fund stewardship. The first hypothesis is related to fund stewardship, while the 
second and the third are related to the actual outcome of fund stewardship. In the next 
chapter, the methods to test the hypotheses are discussed. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the sample and research methods used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3. It begins with a discussion of our data sources in Section 4.2, 
followed by Section 4.3 which describes the cross-sectional regression model used in our 
tests. A summary of this chapter is provided in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Data 
We construct our sample by identifying open-ended U.S. equity funds that have 
both return/holdings and MS Grade data in the Morningstar Direct database. As at 
October 2011, there are 464 such funds covering 2,616 fund classes, representing about 
18% of all mutual fund classes domiciled in the U.S. that invest solely in the U.S. equity 
market. They include 249 large cap funds, 84 mid-cap funds, and 77 small cap funds. 
Among these funds, 102 are value funds, 136 core funds, and 172 growth funds. There 
are also 54 specialty funds in our sample. The total net asset value (fund size) of our 
sample funds is approximately US$2.1 trillion or about 63% of the total net asset value of 
all domestic equity funds in the U.S. 
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For each fund, we collect data on the following fund characteristics: name, size, and 
age; manager names and tenure; objectives as stated in the prospectus; family size; 
number of share classes; net expense ratio; return rank; turnover ratio; managerial 
ownership level; overall stewardship grade; board quality grade; corporate culture grade; 
fees grade; managerial compensation grade; and regulatory history grade. We augment 
data on fund objectives retrieved from the database with styles identified manually from 
the fund’s name, especially for funds whose objective is not associated with size or value 
orientation (e.g., asset allocation or balanced funds). Morningstar Direct provides mutual 
fund data at the fund class level. Since funds typically offer multiple classes which differ 
slightly in the fee components, we carry out our analysis at the fund level instead of fund 
class level.37 The class selected to represent a fund is the one with the largest net asset 
value.  
4.3 Research Method 
We run the following cross-sectional OLS regression model to test the relationship 
between fund stewardship quality and style drift: 
 
 
                                                 
 
37 Various fund classes offered by the same investment company typically have the same investment objectives, 
portfolio holdings, stewardship grades and gain similar returns. 
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𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖 +         𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖  + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜.𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠i+ 𝛽6𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟i + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑔𝑟i +         𝛽8𝑀𝑔𝑡  𝐶ℎ 𝑎 𝑛𝑔𝑒i + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒i + 𝛽10𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒i +  𝜀𝑖  
               (1) 
where for fund i, Style is either the style drift or style dispersion measure for the fund, and 
Governance is our measure of fund stewardship. We include in the regression other fund 
characteristics that are expected to influence the level of style consistency. We discuss the 
measurement of these test variables next. 
4.3.1 Measurement of Style Drift 
Measurement of style drift requires information on fund asset allocation over time. The 
process of estimating asset allocation made by fund managers is known as style analysis. 
The output of this analysis is the fund’s actual investment style (as opposed to 
prospectus/stated style) which comprises weights of assets allocated in a set of styles for 
a particular period. By performing style analysis periodically, we can observe whether 
there is a drift in the fund’s investment style over the observation period. 
There are two approaches to performing style analysis, both of which are used in 
this thesis.38 The first approach, the holdings-based style analysis (HBSA), uses the fund’s 
actual stock holdings data. HBSA evaluates the fund’s exposure to a number of styles 
based on the characteristics of its underlying stocks. Morningstar Direct provides 
                                                 
 
38 See Appendix A. 
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historical percentages of a portfolio’s equity holdings by market-cap size, value-growth 
orientation, and a combination of both. We obtain quarterly percentages (weights) of a 
portfolio’s equity holdings from October 2007 to September 2011. 
The second approach, the returns-based style analysis (RBSA), was first introduced 
by Sharpe (1988) who views asset allocation as playing a significant part in the variability 
of investors’ portfolio returns. Accordingly, the effectiveness of an investor’s overall asset 
allocation can be compared with a mix of asset class benchmarks. Sharpe (1992) explains 
that style analysis can be implemented using quadratic programming for determining the 
fund’s exposure to changes in the returns on major asset classes.  Further, he asserts that 
desirable asset classes for RBSA should be mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and have 
differing returns. Sharpe (1992) concludes that style analysis can help investors achieve 
their investment goals in a cost-effective way. The benefit of RBSA is also supported by 
Gallo and Lockwood (1997) who describe the model as simple, discriminatory, and cost 
effective. 
RBSA is however criticized for failing to detect style drift in a timely manner 
because it is commonly carried out using rolling monthly returns (Christopherson and 
Sabin, 1999; Lucas and Riepe, 1996). Hardy (2003) offers a practical solution to this 
problem by suggesting the use of daily returns instead of rolling monthly returns. He 
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claims that daily data improve the quality and timeliness of RBSA so that it is sensitive 
enough to identify style drift. 
This thesis adopts the RBSA approach of Hardy (2003) using non-overlapping daily 
return data to improve the model’s sensitivity in detecting style drift. The RBSA model is 
expressed as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑚 =  𝑤𝑖1𝑚𝐹1𝑑𝑚 + 𝑤𝑖2𝑚𝐹2𝑑𝑚 + … + 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑚𝐹𝑛𝑑𝑚 + 𝑒𝑖𝑑𝑚,  (2) 
where for fund i on date d of month m (m = 1, 2,..., k), Ridm is the return on the fund; Fxdm 
is the return on a style x benchmark index (x = 1, 2,..., n); wixm is the weight of style x (x = 
1, 2,..., n); and eidm is the error term. We estimate fund style weights using daily returns 
data for a 48-month period extending from October 2007 to September 2011, and fund 
monthly style weights (wixm) are estimated using quadratic programming. Following 
Sharpe (1988, 1992), we constrain wixm to be non-negative and sum to 1 to represent a 
long-only portfolio.  
We use selected style indexes from Morningstar index family, including: (i) nine 
Morningstar Style Indexes; (ii) three Morningstar Composite Style Indexes; and (iii) three 
Morningstar Cap Indexes.39 The Morningstar index family is chosen because it has more 
indexes and this allows for more detailed style analysis. Specifically, the Morningstar 
                                                 
 
39 The nine Morningstar Style Indexes include Morningstar Large Value, Morningstar Large Core, Morningstar Large 
Growth, Morningstar Mid Value, Morningstar Mid Core, Morningstar Mid Growth, Morningstar Small Value, 
Morningstar Small Core, and Morningstar Small Growth. The three Morningstar Composite Style Indexes include 
Morningstar US Value, Morningstar US Core, and Morningstar US Growth. The three Morningstar Cap Indexes 
include Morningstar Large Cap, Morningstar Mid Cap, and Morningstar Small Cap 
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index family consists of 15 indexes associated with 15 different investment styles 
covering 97% of U.S. equity market. 40 In comparison, other popular indexes such as 
Russell indexes accommodate approximately the same coverage 41  with 11 indexes. 
Morningstar indexes also have the added benefit of being constructed using a non-
overlapping approach; this satisfies the mutually exclusive requirement for RBSA which 
we use in our analysis. 
In order to identify fund style drift, researchers need to examine numerous asset 
allocation graphs produced by RBSA and then map the identified style into a style map. 
Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) propose a so-called Style Drift Score (SDS), which 
quantitatively measures style drift of a fund’s portfolio in a single statistic. Low SDS 
represents a low degree of style drift, and a high SDS shows the reverse. They claim that 
SDS is ideal for portfolio screening, comparing style consistency, and monitoring fund 
style drift. 
To calculate SDS, we use fund monthly style weights (wixm) from October 2007 to 
September 2011 obtained from both HBSA and RBSA. As per Idzorek and Bertsch 
(2004), SDS is calculated as the square root of the sum of the variances of the style 
weights obtained from equation (2) above: 
                                                 
 
40  Morningstar applies liquidity screens to exclude the least liquid (micro-cap) stocks – these account for 
approximately 3% of all U.S. domiciled stocks. 
41 Russell 3000E Index represents approximately 99% of the U.S. equity market including 2000 micro-cap stocks 
which are excluded by Morningstar index family. 
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𝐼𝑑𝑧𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑐ℎ 𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑖 =  �𝑉𝑎𝑟 �𝑤𝑖11𝑤𝑖12⋮
𝑤𝑖1𝑘
� + 𝑉𝑎𝑟 �𝑤𝑖21𝑤𝑖22
⋮
𝑤𝑖2𝑘
� + ⋯+ 𝑉𝑎𝑟 �𝑤𝑖𝑛1𝑤𝑖𝑛2
⋮
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑘
� ,   
             (3) 
where SDSi is the style drift score of fund i; and wixm is the weight of style x within fund i 
in month m obtained from the style analysis process. We produce an SDS measure for 
each investment style for each fund: (i) size SDS; (ii) value SDS; and (iii) overall SDS.  
In addition to Idzorek and Bertsch SDS, we also measure fund style drift using 
Morningstar SDS. Instead of measuring the total variance of style weights across time as 
in Idzorek and Bertsch, Morningstar measures the total inter-period differences in style 
exposure for the analysis period using the following formula: 
 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑖 =  ����𝑤𝑖x(m+1) − 𝑤𝑖xm�2𝑛
𝑥=1
 k−1
m=1
 
(4) 
where Morningstar SDSi is the style drift score of fund i. 
From Morningstar, we extract another dimension of style drift, which is style 
dispersion. The style dispersion metric measures the degree of the overall scatter of the 
holdings in the most recent portfolio along with both the value-growth and size 
dimensions. Investments with a low score are considered more consistent and those with 
a high score are less. 
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In sum, two measures of style drift are used in our tests and they are style 
consistency and style dispersion. Both returns-based and holding-based data are used to 
compute style consistency, which in turn are measured using the methods in Morningstar 
and Idzorek and Bertsch (2004). 
Table 4.1 presents the mean value of SDS for each style category. As shown in 
Panel A, the values of size SDS are generally much smaller than those of value SDS. This 
indicates that equity funds tend to drift more in the value dimension than the size 
dimension. Mid-cap funds exhibit a high level of style drift in both dimensions and as a 
consequence, have the highest overall SDS. For specialty funds, the level of style drift in 
both value and size dimensions is the highest since their investment styles are not 
constrained by these dimensions. 
Most style categories in Panel B also exhibit a greater tendency to drift in the value 
dimension than in the size dimension. Small value funds exhibit a considerably high level 
of value style drift but at the same time also have the lowest level of size drift. This 
suggests that it is common for funds in small value category to incline their style toward 
growth category without shifting much in its size style. 
4.3.2 Measurement of Fund Governance 
We use Morningstar Stewardship (MS) Grade data to measure the quality of fund 
stewardship. There are five governance mechanisms (components) contributing to fund 
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stewardship quality in MS Grade. For each component, Morningstar assigns a score 
based on its assessment of quantitative and qualitative factors. The MS Grade 
components with their corresponding factors (subcomponents) and scorings are 
summarized in Appendix B and briefly explained below:  
1) Board Quality considers three factors: (i) independence of directors and chairman; (ii) 
independent directors’ ownership; and (iii) the board’s service to shareholders. The 
first two factors are worth 0.5 point each, and the third factor is worth 1 point. Thus, 
the maximum score for this component (BQ-score) is 2. 
2) Corporate Culture considers four factors:  
i. Focus of the company: whether the fund company is focused on investing or on 
gathering assets; 
ii. Investment process: whether the fund company cultivates a repeatable and risk-
aware investment process;  
iii. Responsible marketing: whether the fund company’s marketing strategy aims to 
grow the fund quickly through flashy advertisements publicizing short-term 
returns; and 
iv. Manager retention: whether the fund retains talented managers at the firm. 
Each factor is worth 1 point. Therefore, the maximum score for this component (CC-
score) is 4. 
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3) Manager Incentives assesses two distinct factors:  
i. Manager Compensation (MC-score); and  
ii. Manager Ownership (MO-score).  
Each factor is worth 1 point so the maximum score for this component (MI-score) is 2. 
4) Fees assesses the fund’s expense ratio relative to its peer group in the same market-cap 
range and fund class. Fees score (F-score) ranges from 0 to 2. 
5) Regulatory History assesses any regulatory issues at the fund company. Funds with no 
regulatory concerns receive a score (RH-score) of 0, while funds with serious issues can 
have its RH-score reduced to -2. 
Morningstar assigns grades from A (best) to F (worst) for each stewardship component 
based on its score. Grades A, B, C, D, and F correspond to full credit, ¾ credit, ½ credit, 
¼ credit, and no credit respectively. The Overall Stewardship Grade (OS-grade) for a fund 
is based on the sum of the above five component scores. OS-grade A, B, C, D, and F 
correspond to total stewardship score (OS-score) of 9-10 points, 7-8.5 points, 5-6.5 points, 
3-4.5 points, and 2.5 points or less, respectively. In this way, the maximum score of 
stewardship components serves as a component weight in the MS Grade methodology 
(Lutton, Rushkewicz, Liu and Ling, 2011). 
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Table 4.1 
Style consistency measures categorized by fund style 
Fund style consistency is measured using the style drift score (SDS), style consistency metric, and style dispersion metric. SDS is measured using the method in Idzorek and Bertsch 
(2004) and Morningstar. The basis for SDS computation is style analysis, i.e RBSA (return-based style analysis) and HBSA (holdings-based style analysis). Style consistency metric 
measures the extent of historical style movement in the style box based on HBSA. Style dispersion metric is the average degree of scatter of the holdings during the observation 
period. In any measure, funds with lower scores are more consistent than those with higher scores. Style consistency is measured either in size dimension (Size), value-growth 
dimension (Value), or combination of both (Overall). Size and Value-Growth are the main bases for classification of equity fund investment styles. Large, Mid, and Small are fund 
styles based on size. Value, Core, and Growth are fund styles based on value orientation. Large Value, Large Core, Large Growth, Mid Value, Mid Core, Mid Growth, Small Value, 
Small Core, and Small Growth are fund styles based on combinations of size and value orientation. Specialty is another style category that invests primarily in the equity of a 
particular industry or sector. Statistics for samples classified by either Size or Value-Growth are in Panel A, while the statistics for samples classified by combinations of both Size 
and Value-Growth are in Panel B. Median values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
RBSA Idzorek & Bertsch SDS RBSA Morningstar SDS HBSA Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Style Consistency Metric Style Dispersion Metric
Overall Size Value Overall Size Value Overall Size Value Overall Size Value Overall Size Value
Panel A. Mean values of style consistency measures by Size, Value-Growth and Specialty
Size
Large 0.337 0.240 0.283 17.91 10.89 13.43 9.17 5.89 8.67 14.69 10.27 21.77 154.23 83.23 128.96
(0.331) (0.237) (0.276) (17.53) (10.52) (13.30) (8.75) (4.99) (8.25) (12.50) (8.25) (19.87) (153.27) (82.58) (129.00)
Mid 0.420 0.323 0.347 22.51 15.22 16.50 10.94 9.06 9.82 18.17 9.15 22.02 136.58 61.61 120.76
(0.417) (0.315) (0.341) (22.12) (14.85) (16.62) (9.80) (8.04) (9.24) (15.36) (7.54) (17.89) (133.70) (55.73) (121.10)
Small 0.401 0.271 0.342 21.44 11.84 16.96 10.38 8.41 8.93 20.17 9.40 20.05 129.56 51.79 118.29
(0.405) (0.277) (0.351) (21.61) (12.20) (17.47) (9.88) (7.59) (8.25) (17.21) (7.52) (17.71) (129.59) (51.07) (118.55)
Value-Growth
Value 0.356 0.237 0.310 19.21 10.63 15.35 9.44 6.46 8.68 12.00 8.96 18.43 141.85 73.09 120.18
(0.356) (0.231) (0.318) (18.60) (10.38) (14.52) (8.90) (5.76) (8.25) (10.07) (7.54) (16.71) (142.05) (76.31) (121.36)
Core 0.352 0.242 0.306 19.19 11.04 15.31 9.25 6.56 8.55 16.08 10.05 22.30 156.37 75.80 135.65
(0.360) (0.233) (0.316) (19.91) (10.52) (15.57) (8.59) (5.38) (8.33) (14.39) (7.97) (21.43) (156.79) (76.62) (136.35)
Growth 0.384 0.296 0.308 20.05 13.55 13.94 10.36 7.71 9.44 19.36 10.28 22.69 140.24 70.40 120.18
(0.387) (0.283) (0.294) (19.99) (13.58) (13.76) (9.76) (6.84) (8.52) (17.32) (8.54) (20.73) (139.12) (71.28) (118.61)
Specialty 0.548 0.416 0.443 24.77 17.77 17.03 15.80 10.60 15.84 25.06 14.79 36.15 147.05 87.91 116.09
(0.564) (0.480) (0.457) (26.24) (20.19) (17.93) (15.65) (10.14) (15.97) (23.59) (14.12) (37.59) (152.51) (89.47) (111.86)
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
RBSA Idzorek & Bertsch SDS RBSA Morningstar SDS HBSA Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Style Consistency Metric Style Dispersion Metric
Overall Size Value Overall Size Value Overall Size Value Overall Size Value Overall Size Value
Panel B. Mean values of style consistency measures by the combinations of Size and Value-Growth style
Large Value 0.329 0.218 0.284 17.25 9.43 13.60 8.98 5.39 8.58 10.84 9.66 19.04 147.87 84.07 120.77
(0.317) (0.211) (0.269) (17.04) (9.42) (13.30) (8.75) (4.64) (8.25) (9.30) (8.06) (16.81) (148.19) (84.65) (122.58)
Large Core 0.315 0.217 0.272 17.13 9.96 13.53 8.66 5.48 8.27 14.52 10.24 22.65 163.34 84.16 139.19
(0.325) (0.192) (0.275) (16.55) (9.58) (13.73) (8.12) (4.57) (7.75) (12.81) (8.15) (22.02) (164.20) (82.65) (141.81)
Large Growth 0.363 0.278 0.292 19.14 12.85 13.21 9.80 6.64 9.12 17.59 10.72 22.89 150.12 81.76 125.11
(0.362) (0.270) (0.286) (18.61) (12.22) (12.96) (9.22) (5.73) (8.46) (16.33) (9.09) (20.92) (149.90) (79.94) (125.04)
Mid Value 0.411 0.309 0.348 22.92 14.90 17.78 11.40 9.65 9.65 13.76 8.02 18.85 132.70 55.41 119.82
(0.394) (0.295) (0.350) (22.39) (14.37) (17.98) (10.99) (9.33) (8.84) (10.89) (6.55) (15.04) (131.18) (50.64) (120.12)
Mid Core 0.430 0.312 0.371 23.27 14.60 18.14 11.16 9.41 10.08 19.19 10.20 25.04 149.39 66.42 132.28
(0.443) (0.306) (0.378) (23.47) (16.32) (18.99) (10.81) (7.63) (10.51) (16.58) (7.39) (22.17) (146.57) (62.19) (130.66)
Mid Growth 0.420 0.337 0.334 21.88 15.72 14.92 10.58 8.58 9.76 19.89 9.17 22.03 131.69 62.20 115.07
(0.416) (0.338) (0.325) (21.99) (15.92) (14.38) (9.73) (7.47) (8.98) (17.85) (8.03) (17.63) (129.58) (56.10) (113.33)
Small Value 0.396 0.216 0.362 22.23 9.67 19.33 8.72 6.68 7.76 14.66 7.15 15.17 128.18 49.52 118.10
(0.406) (0.195) (0.371) (22.51) (9.89) (19.61) (8.44) (6.32) (7.07) (10.82) (6.47) (11.49) (129.04) (49.72) (118.55)
Small Core 0.415 0.269 0.368 22.81 11.68 19.07 9.65 7.90 8.15 18.95 9.22 18.54 137.19 53.76 125.75
(0.437) (0.259) (0.381) (23.77) (10.94) (19.30) (9.04) (5.82) (7.90) (15.70) (7.30) (17.60) (138.39) (53.71) (127.15)
Small Growth 0.394 0.295 0.316 20.24 12.85 14.63 11.50 9.41 9.89 23.12 10.41 22.93 125.28 51.44 113.65
(0.393) (0.290) (0.314) (20.24) (13.22) (14.95) (11.16) (8.85) (8.54) (19.71) (8.82) (19.95) (123.69) (50.19) (112.85)
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A major drawback of MS Grade methodology is the use of ordinal scale 
(from A to F) to measure stewardship although the grade was determined based 
on numeric scores measured in a ratio scale (credit/points awarded by 
Morningstar analysts). The ratio scale carries a higher level of measurement data 
than ordinal scale as it involves a true zero point. In the MS Grade methodology, 
the true zero point occurs when a fund is not awarded any credit since it does 
not satisfy a particular evaluation criterion. The ordinal grades can be misleading 
as they conceal the higher level of measurement data contained in numeric 
scores. Past studies (Casavecchia and Tooman, 2011; Huang and Chen, 2011) do 
not convert the grades back into stewardship scores; instead, they convert the 
ordinal letter variable into another ordinal variable, for example A to 5, B to 4, 
and so on. Thus, the scale degradation occurs in the conversion process as the 
newly constructed variables do not have a true zero point. 
In this study, we use the numeric scores of Morningstar fund stewardship 
data instead of the ordinal stewardship grades. By doing so, we can carry out a 
more precise stewardship analysis benefiting from the higher level of 
measurement data. Additionally, the numeric scores also enable us to decompose 
fund stewardship components into subcomponents with their respective 
48 
 
contributing scores. In this way, we can analyze in more detail the separate roles 
played by stewardship, both at the component and subcomponent levels. 
In addition to the overall fund level analysis, we also carry out analysis at 
the stewardship component level. For this purpose, we include all five 
components of stewardship provided in MS Grade with some modifications. 
Here we also use stewardship component scores instead of grades. Accordingly, 
we use CC-score, BQ-score, MI-score, MO-score, MC-score, F-score, and RH-score as 
respective measures of stewardship component quality for Corporate Culture, Board 
Quality, Manager Incentives, Manager Ownership, Manager Compensation, Fees, and 
Regulatory History. 
Fund stewardship component scores can be easily obtained by converting 
MS component grades based on the MS Grade methodology (Morningstar, 
2011). Fund subcomponent scores (MC-score and MO-score), on the other hand, 
are obtained rather laboriously through Morningstar analysis of stewardship 
grading for each individual fund. By doing so, we can get information on the 
credit awarded by Morningstar analysts to Manager Compensation and Manager 
Ownership subcomponents. We refer to MS Grade methodology to convert the 
credit awarded by Morningstar into the corresponding score. 
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For components/subcomponents of fund stewardship that are quantitative 
in nature, e.g., Fees and Manager Ownership, we obtain the numeric data reported in 
Morningstar Direct to provide an alternative measure to the stewardship 
component scores. The underlying measure of Fees grade in the MS Grade 
methodology is the net expense ratio, so we obtain actual fund net expense ratios 
as an alternative measure of F-scores. Similarly, we collect managerial ownership 
data from Morningstar Direct as it is the underlying measure of MO-scores. In the 
database, managerial ownership is presented in 7 ranges of dollar values, 42 
mirroring the SEC disclosure requirement. For our analysis, we use the mid range 
value of individual manager ownership and sum them to get the total managerial 
ownership for the fund. 
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the sample funds. The Overall 
Stewardship score averages 6.6 and ranges from 1.5 to 10. Although Overall 
Stewardship does not appear to differ across the different size style categories, it is 
marginally higher for the value than for the growth style category. Looking at the 
individual components of stewardship, Board Quality score averages 1.4 (out of a 
possible maximum of score of 2); the average Corporate Culture score is 2.8 (out of 
a maximum score of 4); Fees scores averages 1.3 (out of a maximum score of 2); 
                                                 
 
42 The manager ownership ranges are zero; $1 to $10,000; $10,001 to $50,000; $50,001 to $100,000; 
$100,001 to $500,000; $500,001 to $1 million; and more than $1 million. 
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and the average Manager Incentives score is 1.1 (out of a maximum score of 2). The 
two subcomponents of Manager Incentives, Manager Compensation and Manager 
Ownership, each has an average score of 0.7 and 0.4, respectively. The Regulatory 
History score is -0.01, implying some regulatory issues of concern at the average 
fund company in recent years.  
The average fund has a net expense ratio of 0.98%, is about 21 years (249.2 
months) old, and has total net asset value worth $5 billion, 5.8 fund classes, and a 
turnover ratio of 67.4%. About 38% funds are managed by a single manager, 
with 28% experiencing a management turnover over our sample period. While 
one-third of the funds specify size as the style objective, three-quarters have 
value-growth as the style objective. 
4.3.3 Measurement of Control Variables 
We control for the fund’s relative performance in our tests since it can 
affect the fund managers’ risk taking behavior (Chan, Chen and Lakonishok, 
2002; Lai, Tiwari and Zhang, 2010) which may cause a style drift. This behavior 
is known as the tournament effect (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996) where 
funds with below median mid-year performance increase their risk in the next 
half of the year with the intention of catching up with the better performing 
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funds. We measure the fund’s relative performance (Ret Rank) using its average 
mid-year return rank (for a 4-year observation period) relative to its peers. 
We control for the fund’s Age and Size as they may shape the fund’s ability 
to control style drift. Larger funds, for example, have more limited investment 
opportunity, which may lead to drift.  Age is the number of years from the date 
of inception of the fund, and Size is the total net asset value managed by the 
fund. The number of classes offered (No. Classes) indicates the fund manager’s 
span of control which may affect her ability to monitor the investment style. 
The turnover ratio (Turnover) is the minimum of sales or purchases divided by the 
average monthly net assets, and it controls for the effect of management activity 
on the level of style drift. As risk taking behavior of team-managed funds is 
significantly different from single manager funds (Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi, 2005), 
we include Single Mgr, which takes the value of one if the fund is managed by one 
manager, and zero otherwise. A change in management may also affect the fund 
investment style (Gallo and Lockwood, 1999; Khorana, 2001), so we include Mgt 
Change, which takes the value of zero if there is least one manager running the 
fund continuously over the sample period, and one otherwise. 43
                                                 
 
43 Data on manager tenure obtained from Morningstar Direct are used to determine the value of this 
variable. For funds with more than one manager, we select the manager with the longest tenure. 
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive statistics of samples categorized by fund style 
Size and Value-Growth are the main bases for classification of equity fund investment styles. Large, Mid, and Small are fund styles based on size. Value, Core, and Growth are fund 
styles based on value orientation. Large Value, Large Core, Large Growth, Mid Value, Mid Core, Mid Growth, Small Value, Small Core, and Small Growth are fund styles based on 
combinations of size and value orientation. Specialty is another style category that invests primarily in the equity of a particular industry or sector. Overall Stewardship, Board Quality, 
Corporate Culture, Manager Incentives, Manager Compensation, Manager Ownership, Regulatory History, and Fees are numeric scores of Morningstar stewardship grades. Net expense ratio is the 
percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year return rank percentile (for a 4-year observation period) of a 
particular fund relative to its peers. Age is the number of months since the date of inception of the fund, and Size is the fund’s total asset under management. No of classes is the 
number of share classes offered by the fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of sales or purchases divided by average monthly net assets. Single manager indicates if fund is managed by 
one manager. Management change indicates whether there was a total change in managers during the observation period (October 2007-September 2011). Size objective and Value-
Growth objective indicate if fund has a specific style objective in terms of size and value-growth respectively. Median values are reported in parentheses. 
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Panel A. Mean statistics of samples by Size, Value-Growth and Specialty
Size
Large 249 6.6 1.4 2.7 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.3 0.89 47.1 279.1 7.22 6.2 64.6 0.37 0.31 0.16 0.90
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (0.91) (46.0) (217.0) (2.17) (6.0) (47.7) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Mid 84 6.6 1.4 2.8 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.3 1.05 49.2 224.7 3.48 5.6 68.9 0.37 0.27 0.54 0.94
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (0.7) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (1.04) (47.6) (188.5) (1.60) (6.0) (54.0) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Small 77 6.6 1.4 2.9 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 1.3 1.15 45.4 189.7 2.07 5.5 65.3 0.27 0.17 0.86 0.66
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.0) (0.0) (1.5) (1.19) (44.3) (170.0) (1.17) (6.0) (52.0) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Value-Growth
Value 102 6.8 1.5 2.7 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.93 48.4 242.4 4.65 6.7 50.7 0.24 0.25 0.40 0.80
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (0.94) (47.3) (187.5) (1.73) (7.0) (37.9) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Core 136 6.7 1.3 3.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.3 0.90 46.0 249.8 7.10 5.2 57.2 0.38 0.22 0.35 0.83
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.0) (0.0) (1.5) (0.95) (44.4) (181.5) (1.89) (5.0) (37.4) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Growth 172 6.4 1.4 2.7 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.2 1.04 47.3 257.5 4.68 6.1 81.2 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.92
(6.3) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (1.02) (46.6) (208.0) (1.58) (6.0) (68.0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Specialty 54 6.6 1.4 2.6 1.0 0.7 0.4 -0.1 1.7 1.03 44.5 234.0 2.23 4.5 79.7 0.57 0.33 0.00 0.02
(6.5) (1.5) (2.0) (1.0) (0.8) (0.0) (0.0) (2.0) (0.96) (42.3) (213.0) (1.08) (5.0) (56.4) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
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Panel B. Mean statistics of samples by combinations of Size and Value-Growth
Large Value 66 6.7 1.5 2.7 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.85 48.0 272.5 5.83 6.9 51.8 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.74
(6.5) (1.5) (2.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (0.85) (47.3) (211.5) (1.84) (7.0) (38.0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Large Core 90 6.7 1.4 2.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.3 0.84 47.2 281.4 8.72 5.6 62.3 0.37 0.22 0.18 0.92
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.0) (0.0) (1.5) (0.90) (46.3) (197.0) (1.91) (6.0) (34.5) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Large Growth 93 6.3 1.4 2.6 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.96 46.3 281.6 6.79 6.3 75.9 0.48 0.40 0.11 0.98
(6.0) (1.5) (2.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (0.97) (45.5) (225.0) (2.44) (6.0) (65.0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Mid Value 21 7.2 1.5 3.0 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.5 1.05 48.3 193.7 2.80 5.5 54.4 0.29 0.14 0.57 0.95
(7.0) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (0.8) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (1.01) (46.3) (158.0) (1.48) (6.0) (46.4) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Mid Core 22 6.3 1.2 2.9 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 1.3 0.99 45.7 195.9 5.33 4.8 52.5 0.50 0.27 0.45 0.91
(6.0) (1.0) (3.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.0) (0.0) (1.5) (1.13) (44.0) (182.5) (1.90) (5.5) (46.5) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)
Mid Growth 41 6.5 1.5 2.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.2 1.07 51.4 256.0 2.86 6.1 85.1 0.34 0.34 0.56 0.95
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.0) (1.5) (1.04) (48.8) (210.0) (1.47) (6.0) (78.0) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Small Value 15 6.7 1.5 2.6 1.2 0.9 0.4 -0.1 1.4 1.13 50.5 177.7 2.23 7.2 40.2 0.20 0.20 1.00 0.87
(6.5) (1.5) (2.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.0) (0.0) (1.5) (1.24) (53.8) (178.0) (1.73) (7.0) (33.0) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Small Core 24 7.0 1.3 3.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.3 1.03 42.1 180.8 2.90 4.2 42.2 0.33 0.17 0.88 0.42
(6.8) (1.5) (4.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.0) (1.8) (1.10) (41.0) (160.5) (1.49) (4.0) (39.1) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00)
Small Growth 38 6.4 1.4 2.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 -0.1 1.2 1.14 45.5 200.2 1.46 5.6 89.9 0.26 0.16 0.79 0.74
(6.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.0) (0.5) (0.3) (0.0) (1.5) (1.19) (44.1) (177.0) (0.95) (6.0) (82.0) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Panel C. Descriptive statistics of all samples
Mean 6.6 1.4 2.8 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.3 0.98 47.0 249.2 5.08 5.8 67.4 0.38 0.28 0.33 0.76
Median 6.5 1.5 3.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.5 1.00 46.0 199.0 1.66 6 51.0 0 0 0 1
Maximum 10.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 2.49 94.0 1047.0 160.93 26.0 453.0 1 1 1 1
Minimum 1.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.04 5.0 18.0 0.0011 1.0 2.0 0 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 1.6 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.37 14.0 177.8 13.74 3.9 58.6 0.49 0.45 0.47 0.43
Observations 464 464 464 464 427 427 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464
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We also include dummies to denote whether the fund has specific style 
objectives in terms of size (Size Objective) or value-growth (Value-Growth Objective) 
since the level of style drift has been found to be influenced by the style of the 
fund (Brown, Harlow and Zhang, 2012; Wermers, 2012). 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter details the data and research method employed to test our 
three main hypotheses. In the next chapter, the empirical results are discussed. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical results. The results of the univariate 
tests are provided in Section 5.2, followed by Section 5.3 which presents the 
results of multivariate tests. Section 5.4 provides a summary of this chapter. 
5.2 Univariate Results 
Table 5.1 displays univariate results of differences in mean and median of 
the various measures of style drift between funds with “high” and “low” scores 
on the characteristics shown. Funds are classified as “High” or “Low” based on 
the median value. For RBSA Morningstar SDS, the association between fund 
stewardship measures and style drift is considerably strong, especially for the Size 
and Overall dimensions of SDS. The weakest relationship with stewardship is 
exhibited by Value SDS where Overall Stewardship and Corporate Culture are not 
significantly related to Value SDS. Regulatory History is the only stewardship 
component that is not significantly related to style drift in any dimension of SDS.  
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Table 5.1 
Univariate tests of mean differences 
Fund style consistency is measured using the style drift score (SDS), style consistency metric, and style dispersion 
metric. SDS is measured using the method in Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) and Morningstar. The bases for SDS 
computation are RBSA (return-based style analysis) and HBSA (holdings-based style analysis). Style consistency 
metric measures the extent of historical style movement in the style box based on HBSA. Style dispersion metric is 
the average degree of scatter of the holdings throughout the observation period. In any measure, funds with lower 
scores are more consistent than those with higher scores. Style consistency is measured in size dimension (Size), 
value-growth dimension (Value), or combination of both (Overall). Funds are classified as “High” or “Low” based on 
the median value. Overall Stewardship, Board Quality, Corporate Culture, Manager Incentives, Manager Compensation, Manager 
Ownership, Regulatory History, and Fees are numeric scores of Morningstar stewardship grades. Net expense ratio is the 
percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year 
return rank percentile (for a 4-year observation period) of the fund relative to its peers. Age is the number of months 
since the date of inception of the fund, and Size is the fund’s total asset under management. No of classes is the number 
of share classes offered by the fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of sales or purchases divided by average monthly 
net assets. Single manager scores one if fund is managed by one manager, and zero otherwise. Management change scores 
one if there was a total change in managers during the observation period (October 2007-September 2011), and zero 
otherwise. Size objective and Value-Growth objective scores one if the fund has a specific style objective in terms of size 
and value-growth respectively, and zero otherwise. The results of median difference tests are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
RBSA Morningstar SDS
Low High Low High Low High
Overall Stewardship 20.75 19.43 0.019 ** 13.37 11.76 0.002 *** 15.07 14.95 0.796
(20.74) (19.66) (0.043) ** (12.94) (11.06) (0.003) *** (14.97) (14.38) (0.909)
Board Quality 21.82 19.34 0.000 *** 14.34 11.82 0.000 *** 15.81 14.62 0.015 **
(21.92) (19.28) (0.000) *** (14.13) (11.30) (0.000) *** (15.54) (14.02) (0.008) ***
Corporate Culture 20.51 19.26 0.045 ** 12.98 11.80 0.044 ** 15.10 14.79 0.542
(20.21) (19.76) (0.234) (12.44) (11.25) (0.081) * (14.81) (14.47) (0.782)
Manager Incentives 19.40 21.41 0.000 *** 12.06 13.65 0.003 *** 14.35 16.11 0.000 ***
(19.30) (21.09) (0.001) *** (11.47) (13.74) (0.001) *** (13.79) (15.64) (0.000) ***
Manager Compensation 21.17 19.28 0.001 *** 13.60 11.69 0.000 *** 15.59 14.69 0.057 *
(21.58) (19.17) (0.001) *** (13.16) (11.29) (0.000) *** (15.54) (13.95) (0.057) *
Manager Ownership 18.76 21.60 0.000 *** 11.60 13.63 0.000 *** 13.90 16.29 0.000 ***
(18.50) (21.43) (0.000) *** (11.05) (13.60) (0.000) *** (13.30) (16.14) (0.000) ***
Regulatory History 19.21 20.19 0.584 12.55 12.66 0.947 12.92 15.07 0.145
(19.58) (20.17) (0.625) (9.89) (12.31) (0.425) (12.90) (14.81) (0.166)
Fees 21.21 18.49 0.000 *** 13.58 11.20 0.000 *** 15.57 14.13 0.002 ***
(21.04) (18.89) (0.000) *** (13.09) (10.38) (0.000) *** (15.22) (13.95) (0.006) ***
Net expense ratio 18.89 21.48 0.000 *** 11.76 13.58 0.001 *** 14.08 15.98 0.000 ***
(18.61) (21.64) (0.000) *** (11.12) (13.14) (0.000) *** (13.64) (16.37) (0.000) ***
Return rank 20.01 20.30 0.602 12.62 12.69 0.893 15.02 15.01 0.975
(19.39) (20.31) (0.488) (12.12) (12.37) (0.930) (14.55) (15.00) (0.780)
Age 20.28 20.05 0.681 12.71 12.60 0.839 15.13 14.90 0.624
(20.63) (19.86) (0.276) (12.75) (11.59) (0.622) (15.01) (14.43) (0.431)
Size 21.32 19.02 0.000 *** 13.65 11.67 0.000 *** 15.63 14.41 0.008 ***
(21.09) (19.16) (0.000) *** (13.27) (11.31) (0.001) *** (15.26) (14.07) (0.028) **
No of classes 20.44 19.73 0.210 13.19 11.84 0.012 ** 14.99 15.05 0.910
(20.97) (19.59) (0.041) ** (12.98) (11.29) (0.010) ** (14.81) (14.73) (0.884)
Turnover ratio 19.29 21.11 0.001 *** 11.75 13.63 0.000 *** 14.74 15.33 0.200
(19.44) (20.69) (0.019) ** (11.30) (13.08) (0.001) *** (14.73) (14.81) (0.403)
Single manager 20.26 20.00 0.662 12.38 13.12 0.173 15.35 14.45 0.058 *
(20.02) (20.68) (0.849) (11.53) (13.16) (0.095) * (15.01) (14.34) (0.105)
Management change 19.88 20.98 0.083 * 12.29 13.70 0.019 ** 15.00 15.05 0.932
(20.21) (20.02) (0.354) (12.18) (12.65) (0.103) (14.99) (13.62) (0.608)
Size objective 20.35 19.77 0.326 13.08 11.79 0.021 ** 14.96 15.13 0.722
(20.19) (20.09) (0.649) (12.35) (12.12) (0.137) (14.60) (15.01) (0.617)
Value-Growth objective 22.50 19.41 0.000 *** 14.40 12.10 0.000 *** 16.62 14.50 0.000 ***
(23.31) (19.66) (0.000) *** (13.27) (11.89) (0.014) ** (17.13) (14.22) (0.000) ***
ValueOverall Size
p-value p-value p-value
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
 
RBSA Idzorek & Bertsch SDS HBSA Idzorek & Bertsch SDS
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Overall Stewardship 0.402 0.370 0.003 *** 0.298 0.259 0.000 *** 0.332 0.313 0.054 * 10.94 9.85 0.007 *** 8.40 6.18 0.000 *** 10.05 9.38 0.126
(0.400) (0.370) (0.008) *** (0.280) (0.250) (0.000) *** (0.330) (0.305) (0.135) (10.17) (8.77) (0.000) *** (7.20) (5.50) (0.000) *** (8.97) (8.38) (0.016) **
Board Quality 0.421 0.371 0.000 *** 0.314 0.265 0.000 *** 0.347 0.312 0.001 *** 11.18 10.11 0.012 ** 8.34 6.99 0.002 *** 10.34 9.47 0.059 *
(0.420) (0.370) (0.000) *** (0.310) (0.260) (0.000) *** (0.340) (0.300) (0.001) *** (10.11) (9.54) (0.006) *** (7.14) (6.02) (0.001) *** (9.32) (8.46) (0.008) ***
Corporate Culture 0.397 0.362 0.004 *** 0.290 0.259 0.010 ** 0.330 0.306 0.031 ** 10.69 9.85 0.064 * 7.84 6.33 0.001 *** 9.93 9.30 0.195
(0.390) (0.370) (0.039) ** (0.280) (0.260) (0.016) ** (0.320) (0.310) (0.169) (9.83) (8.20) (0.003) *** (6.61) (5.19) (0.000) *** (8.88) (7.80) (0.009) ***
Manager Incentives 0.380 0.399 0.093 * 0.275 0.292 0.121 0.317 0.334 0.079 * 10.63 10.20 0.298 7.70 6.98 0.089 * 9.98 9.39 0.189
(0.380) (0.390) (0.085) * (0.270) (0.280) (0.050) ** (0.310) (0.330) (0.036) ** (9.82) (9.45) (0.177) (6.56) (6.05) (0.072) * (8.92) (8.57) (0.206)
Manager Compensation 0.407 0.368 0.000 *** 0.301 0.258 0.000 *** 0.337 0.311 0.012 ** 11.04 9.87 0.006 *** 7.91 6.97 0.029 ** 10.28 9.15 0.012 **
(0.410) (0.360) (0.000) *** (0.290) (0.250) (0.000) *** (0.340) (0.310) (0.023) ** (10.28) (9.08) (0.002) *** (7.01) (6.02) (0.009) *** (9.31) (8.26) (0.003) ***
Manager Ownership 0.363 0.410 0.000 *** 0.260 0.298 0.001 *** 0.302 0.344 0.000 *** 9.98 10.92 0.026 ** 7.38 7.50 0.791 9.26 10.16 0.047 **
(0.350) (0.410) (0.000) *** (0.250) (0.290) (0.000) *** (0.280) (0.340) (0.000) *** (9.34) (9.86) (0.048) ** (6.46) (6.34) (0.958) (8.57) (9.18) (0.031) **
Regulatory History 0.412 0.387 0.468 0.286 0.281 0.873 0.327 0.323 0.898 10.94 10.45 0.620 7.44 7.44 0.999 11.01 9.71 0.220
(0.410) (0.390) (0.639) (0.250) (0.270) (0.687) (0.290) (0.320) (0.892) (9.85) (9.71) (0.531) (6.83) (6.36) (0.694) (8.42) (8.77) (0.410)
Fees 0.402 0.364 0.001 *** 0.296 0.257 0.000 *** 0.334 0.307 0.008 *** 10.85 9.84 0.015 ** 8.01 6.48 0.000 *** 9.92 9.50 0.342
(0.400) (0.350) (0.000) *** (0.285) (0.240) (0.000) *** (0.330) (0.290) (0.005) *** (10.14) (8.75) (0.001) *** (6.93) (5.52) (0.000) *** (9.03) (8.36) (0.022) **
Net expense ratio 0.364 0.412 0.000 *** 0.261 0.302 0.000 *** 0.305 0.343 0.000 *** 9.62 11.29 0.000 *** 6.32 8.51 0.000 *** 9.15 10.35 0.005 ***
(0.350) (0.410) (0.000) *** (0.250) (0.290) (0.000) *** (0.290) (0.340) (0.000) *** (8.89) (10.53) (0.000) *** (5.24) (7.67) (0.000) *** (8.49) (9.25) (0.001) ***
Return rank 0.388 0.387 0.969 0.325 0.322 0.812 0.282 0.280 0.859 10.56 10.39 0.659 7.74 7.16 0.158 9.59 9.92 0.456
(0.390) (0.390) (0.962) (0.270) (0.270) (0.919) (0.320) (0.320) (0.859) (9.74) (9.72) (0.994) (6.66) (6.08) (0.115) (8.63) (8.97) (0.168)
Age 0.389 0.386 0.798 0.284 0.278 0.536 0.324 0.323 0.867 10.26 10.68 0.299 7.58 7.29 0.477 9.49 10.03 0.212
(0.390) (0.380) (0.507) (0.280) (0.270) (0.510) (0.320) (0.310) (0.642) (9.74) (9.71) (0.476) (6.49) (6.32) (0.585) (8.55) (8.94) (0.249)
Size 0.412 0.363 0.000 *** 0.304 0.259 0.000 *** 0.340 0.307 0.001 *** 11.58 9.37 0.000 *** 8.43 6.42 0.000 *** 10.73 8.81 0.000 ***
(0.400) (0.365) (0.000) *** (0.290) (0.260) (0.000) *** (0.340) (0.310) (0.007) *** (10.77) (8.89) (0.000) *** (7.40) (5.54) (0.000) *** (9.35) (8.30) (0.000) ***
No of classes 0.392 0.381 0.301 0.292 0.265 0.014 ** 0.324 0.323 0.906 10.74 10.06 0.095 * 7.70 7.04 0.120 10.03 9.34 0.119
(0.390) (0.380) (0.091) * (0.285) (0.260) (0.008) *** (0.320) (0.320) (0.765) (9.76) (9.72) (0.315) (6.45) (6.20) (0.525) (9.01) (8.51) (0.327)
Turnover ratio 0.368 0.409 0.000 *** 0.256 0.308 0.000 *** 0.311 0.337 0.009 *** 9.49 11.50 0.000 *** 6.12 8.80 0.000 *** 8.90 10.67 0.000 ***
(0.370) (0.390) (0.002) *** (0.250) (0.290) (0.000) *** (0.310) (0.330) (0.030) ** (8.76) (10.78) (0.000) *** (5.25) (7.91) (0.000) *** (8.25) (9.41) (0.000) ***
Single manager 0.387 0.388 0.946 0.276 0.289 0.226 0.327 0.318 0.393 10.58 10.29 0.486 7.21 7.82 0.150 9.84 9.63 0.645
(0.385) (0.390) (0.785) (0.270) (0.290) (0.149) (0.325) (0.310) (0.283) (9.78) (9.49) (0.567) (6.22) (6.45) (0.282) (8.74) (8.82) (0.862)
Management change 0.385 0.394 0.502 0.275 0.298 0.055 * 0.323 0.323 0.962 10.31 10.89 0.195 7.08 8.36 0.005 *** 9.64 10.08 0.360
(0.390) (0.390) (0.817) (0.270) (0.280) (0.091) * (0.320) (0.310) (0.644) (9.54) (9.79) (0.120) (6.19) (6.68) (0.005) *** (8.73) (8.90) (0.158)
Size objective 0.397 0.367 0.009 *** 0.290 0.263 0.016 ** 0.331 0.307 0.019 ** 10.86 9.67 0.005 *** 7.42 7.48 0.887 10.39 8.48 0.000 ***
(0.390) (0.390) (0.071) * (0.280) (0.270) (0.116) (0.320) (0.320) (0.102) (9.81) (9.43) (0.023) ** (6.18) (6.51) (0.404) (9.21) (7.86) (0.000) ***
Value-Growth objective 0.464 0.363 0.000 *** 0.334 0.264 0.000 *** 0.387 0.303 0.000 *** 13.16 9.64 0.000 *** 9.18 6.90 0.000 *** 12.63 8.88 0.000 ***
(0.475) (0.370) (0.000) *** (0.330) (0.270) (0.000) *** (0.390) (0.300) (0.000) *** (13.09) (9.22) (0.000) *** (8.45) (6.05) (0.000) *** (11.67) (8.44) (0.000) ***
Overall Size Value
p-value p-value p-value p-value
Overall Size Value
p-value p-value
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
Style Consistency Metric Style Dispersion Metric
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Overall Stewardship 18.27 16.38 0.056 * 11.99 8.44 0.000 *** 24.30 21.79 0.040 ** 147.62 144.04 0.054 * 77.64 70.64 0.000 *** 124.17 124.22 0.975
(16.64) (12.45) (0.000) *** (9.73) (7.06) (0.000) *** (21.46) (17.89) (0.001) *** (148.06) (144.94) (0.075) * (79.18) (72.12) (0.000) *** (124.94) (124.51) (0.948)
Board Quality 18.24 17.06 0.253 12.07 9.64 0.000 *** 25.36 22.14 0.012 ** 150.57 143.82 0.001 *** 79.34 72.24 0.000 *** 126.50 123.04 0.031 **
(16.26) (13.82) (0.009) *** (9.19) (8.09) (0.000) *** (22.39) (18.54) (0.001) ** (151.67) (144.31) (0.001) *** (79.60) (73.77) (0.001) *** (128.24) (123.13) (0.029) **
Corporate Culture 17.61 17.02 0.597 11.04 8.83 0.001 *** 23.63 22.06 0.251 146.45 145.03 0.496 75.79 71.35 0.037 ** 123.99 124.74 0.663
(15.46) (13.07) (0.011) ** (8.99) (6.81) (0.000) *** (21.19) (17.71) (0.010) *** (147.73) (144.26) (0.520) (76.93) (72.82) (0.053) * (124.72) (124.88) (0.707)
Manager Incentives 18.14 16.27 0.064 * 10.81 9.82 0.114 24.25 21.43 0.025 ** 145.07 147.78 0.155 73.80 76.00 0.260 123.40 125.54 0.172
(15.35) (14.55) (0.350) (8.68) (7.88) (0.036) ** (21.20) (18.57) (0.068) * (144.59) (148.08) (0.171) (76.62) (75.51) (0.344) (122.97) (126.80) (0.156)
Manager Compensation 18.83 16.27 0.014 ** 11.22 9.52 0.008 *** 24.97 21.31 0.004 *** 148.43 143.71 0.014 ** 76.47 72.29 0.034 ** 125.81 122.86 0.060 *
(15.75) (13.01) (0.010) ** (9.09) (7.57) (0.001) *** (21.40) (18.34) (0.002) *** (149.52) (143.64) (0.017) ** (78.23) (72.63) (0.021) ** (126.65) (122.67) (0.078) *
Manager Ownership 16.84 18.24 0.179 10.42 10.35 0.909 22.64 23.65 0.430 146.32 145.90 0.829 74.76 74.07 0.729 124.32 124.39 0.965
(13.75) (15.64) (0.054) * (8.21) (8.36) (0.917) (19.33) (20.91) (0.132) (145.10) (147.65) (0.897) (76.70) (74.86) (0.737) (123.26) (124.98) (0.887)
Regulatory History 16.83 17.48 0.788 11.21 10.42 0.593 24.07 23.17 0.764 143.63 146.18 0.574 77.15 74.49 0.566 119.38 124.41 0.177
(15.81) (15.08) (0.691) (10.13) (8.27) (0.139) (23.04) (20.32) (0.448) (149.49) (147.12) (0.937) (80.57) (76.04) (0.649) (115.52) (124.91) (0.271)
Fees 17.97 16.58 0.167 11.20 9.19 0.001 *** 23.30 23.06 0.848 145.79 146.53 0.698 75.88 72.48 0.080 * 123.08 126.04 0.058 *
(15.88) (11.75) (0.001) *** (9.08) (7.34) (0.000) *** (21.23) (18.29) (0.068) * (146.18) (148.35) (0.469) (76.43) (75.98) (0.125) (123.26) (127.60) (0.020) **
Net expense ratio 15.47 19.36 0.000 *** 9.47 11.40 0.001 *** 22.28 24.12 0.129 150.12 142.16 0.000 *** 77.89 71.43 0.001 *** 127.04 121.43 0.000 ***
(12.63) (16.67) (0.000) *** (7.86) (9.31) (0.000) *** (18.90) (21.21) (0.094) * (150.67) (141.68) (0.000) *** (78.07) (70.22) (0.000) *** (127.92) (121.59) (0.000) ***
Return rank 17.36 17.54 0.852 10.51 10.39 0.847 22.52 23.84 0.277 145.96 146.17 0.912 76.21 73.15 0.105 123.00 125.27 0.134
(15.20) (15.09) (0.707) (8.35) (8.47) (0.740) (19.38) (21.16) (0.127) (146.13) (147.87) (0.772) (77.96) (74.85) (0.107) (122.63) (125.99) (0.089) *
Age 18.14 16.76 0.155 10.52 10.38 0.808 23.04 23.39 0.774 145.50 146.64 0.537 72.64 76.57 0.037 ** 124.63 123.75 0.563
(15.35) (14.59) (0.467) (8.35) (8.38) (0.724) (19.85) (20.65) (0.501) (145.56) (147.94) (0.535) (75.26) (77.69) (0.049) ** (124.38) (124.88) (0.627)
Size 19.42 15.39 0.000 *** 11.86 8.93 0.000 *** 25.08 21.26 0.002 *** 145.13 147.31 0.245 74.75 74.45 0.879 122.88 125.89 0.050 **
(16.68) (13.07) (0.000) *** (9.61) (7.46) (0.000) *** (21.52) (18.53) (0.002) *** (144.41) (148.16) (0.199) (75.49) (76.59) (0.994) (122.50) (127.60) (0.024) **
No of classes 18.24 16.23 0.044 ** 11.06 9.51 0.013 ** 24.12 21.82 0.064 * 147.92 143.23 0.013 ** 76.17 72.20 0.039 ** 125.25 122.56 0.082 *
(15.60) (13.82) (0.279) (8.51) (8.30) (0.210) (20.98) (19.61) (0.179) (149.83) (142.99) (0.004) *** (77.35) (72.96) (0.027) ** (127.15) (122.52) (0.042) **
Turnover ratio 14.54 20.47 0.000 *** 8.40 12.57 0.000 *** 20.14 26.41 0.000 *** 145.35 146.69 0.469 72.37 76.80 0.019 ** 124.87 123.42 0.341
(11.55) (17.55) (0.000) *** (7.13) (10.28) (0.000) *** (18.00) (22.30) (0.000) *** (147.03) (147.09) (0.529) (73.41) (79.24) (0.012) ** (125.63) (123.87) (0.283)
Single manager 17.20 17.87 0.502 9.93 11.31 0.027 ** 22.58 24.26 0.177 144.40 148.83 0.020 ** 72.52 78.07 0.004 *** 123.57 125.22 0.291
(14.12) (17.18) (0.052) * (8.23) (9.13) (0.065) * (18.77) (22.08) (0.023) ** (144.94) (151.23) (0.018) ** (73.22) (79.42) (0.003) *** (124.27) (127.19) (0.278)
Management change 16.66 19.48 0.009 *** 9.82 12.06 0.001 *** 21.97 26.38 0.001 *** 144.48 150.13 0.006 *** 73.36 77.78 0.035 ** 122.99 127.24 0.012 **
(13.82) (17.42) (0.001) *** (8.06) (9.98) (0.000) *** (18.80) (22.07) (0.000) *** (144.54) (153.25) (0.003) *** (75.38) (78.21) (0.031) ** (123.59) (128.24) (0.011) **
Size objective 17.79 16.74 0.313 11.32 8.65 0.000 *** 25.01 19.52 0.000 *** 151.43 135.03 0.000 *** 82.49 58.37 0.000 *** 125.77 120.93 0.003 ***
(15.39) (13.66) (0.124) (9.28) (7.29) (0.000) *** (21.55) (17.63) (0.000) *** (152.22) (134.42) (0.000) *** (82.74) (53.94) (0.000) *** (127.34) (120.94) (0.002) ***
Value-Growth objective 21.55 16.18 0.000 *** 12.61 9.78 0.000 *** 29.60 21.24 0.000 *** 144.54 146.54 0.358 77.56 73.70 0.082 * 119.72 125.57 0.001 ***
(18.48) (13.93) (0.000) *** (11.60) (8.10) (0.000) *** (24.63) (18.90) (0.000) *** (144.84) (147.89) (0.393) (78.81) (75.61) (0.116) (121.74) (125.89) (0.003) ***
Overall Size ValueOverall Size Value
p-value p-valuep-value p-value p-value p-value
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The relationship between Stewardship and style drift is generally negative, except 
for Manager Incentives and Manager Ownership. We also observe more or less similar 
findings in other style consistency measures, except for the Style Dispersion 
Metric, which exhibits the weakest relationship with stewardship components. 
Table 5.2 shows that, as expected, there is a high correlation between the 
overall stewardship score and the individual stewardship component scores. 
Therefore, we will use only one of them in the regressions at any one time. The 
correlations between the remaining variables are quantitatively small, suggesting 
that multicollinearity is not likely to pose a significant problem. 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Next, we run regressions of style drift on stewardship quality. The results for 
style consistency measured using the methods in Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) and 
Morningstar are both reported in Tables 5.3 (returns-based) and 5.4 (holding-
based). In both tables, we report the results for the overall style consistency in 
Panel A; style consistency on the size dimension in Panel B; and style consistency 
on the value-growth dimension in Panel C. In all the regression specifications, we 
measure fund stewardship using either the Overall Stewardship score or its 
component scores. Control variables are included in all specifications. 
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Table 5.2 
Pearson correlation matrix 
Overall Stewardship, Board Quality, Corporate Culture, Manager Incentives, Manager Compensation, Manager Ownership, Regulatory History, and Fees are numeric scores of Morningstar 
stewardship grades. Net expense ratio is the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year return rank percentile 
(for a 4-year observation period) of a particular fund relative to its peers. Age is the number of months since the date of inception of the fund, and Size is the fund’s total asset under 
management. No of classes is the number of share classes offered by the fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of sales or purchases divided by average monthly net assets. Single manager 
indicates if fund is managed by one manager. Management change indicates whether there was a total change in managers during the observation period (October 2007-September 
2011). Size objective and Value-Growth objective indicate if fund has a specific style objective in terms of size and value-growth respectively.  
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Overall Stewardship 1.00
Board Quality 0.49 1.00
Corporate Culture 0.78 0.20 1.00
Manager Incentives 0.39 0.10 0.19 1.00
Manager Compensation 0.46 0.43 0.13 0.31 1.00
Manager Ownership 0.39 0.03 0.25 0.85 0.06 1.00
Regulatory History 0.24 0.04 0.23 0.14 0.03 0.07 1.00
Fees 0.55 0.16 0.15 -0.07 0.16 -0.11 -0.06 1.00
Net expense ratio -0.41 -0.07 -0.29 0.11 -0.06 0.13 -0.11 -0.54 1.00
Return rank -0.20 -0.03 -0.22 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.17 -0.04 0.19 1.00
Age 0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.02 -0.06 1.00
Size 0.33 0.06 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.28 -0.44 -0.21 0.31 1.00
No of classes -0.15 0.17 -0.28 0.01 0.18 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.05 1.00
Turnover ratio -0.40 -0.10 -0.32 -0.22 -0.14 -0.20 -0.06 -0.25 0.21 0.15 -0.01 -0.30 0.09 1.00
Single manager (dummy) -0.08 -0.23 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.16 -0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.20 0.10 1.00
Management change (dummy) -0.17 -0.06 -0.23 -0.07 0.04 -0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.08 -0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.15 1.00
Size objective (dummy) 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.00 -0.23 -0.13 0.07 0.02 -0.15 -0.09 1.00
Value-Growth objective (dummy) -0.05 0.13 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 0.14 -0.04 0.00 0.16 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.05 1.00
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Recall that a lower SDS score indicates greater style consistency and thus 
lower style drift. Panel A of Table 5.3 shows the fund’s Overall Stewardship is 
insignificant, irrespective of how we measure SDS (specifications (1) and (4)). 
Therefore, better overall fund stewardship quality does not necessarily increase 
the monitoring of fund investment style. Using the individual stewardship 
component measures, specifications (2) and (5) show Manager Incentives has a 
significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that funds with a better managerial 
incentive scheme exhibit less style consistency, contrary to our expectations.  
We are intrigued by this finding and investigate it further by looking at the 
subcomponents of Manager Incentives, i.e., Manager Ownership and Manager 
Compensation. As specifications (3) and (6) show, both the subcomponents are 
significant but have opposing signs. Specifically, Manager Compensation has a 
significantly negative coefficient while Manager Ownership has a significantly 
positive one. The MS Grade methodology considers funds that reward long-term 
performance as having a better manager compensation structure. Our result 
suggests that a compensation scheme that rewards long-term performance is able 
to moderate fund managers’ interests to pursue short-term performance. For this 
reason, funds with a better compensation structure are less likely to take on 
short-term performance-chasing activities such risk-shifting and style drifting, 
which is in line with hypothesis H1c. 
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Table 5.3 
OLS regressions of RBSA style consistency on fund stewardship 
Fund actual style is estimated using Return-Based Style Analysis (RBSA), and then its consistency is measured using 
Style Drift Score (SDS) method in Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) and Morningstar. Funds with lower SDS are more 
consistent than those with higher scores. SDS is measured either in size dimension, value-growth dimension, or 
combination of both. Results for Overall SDS, the style consistency measure for both size and value-growth 
dimensions, are in Panel A; Size SDS, the style consistency measure for the size dimension, in Panel B; and Value 
SDS, the style consistency measure for the value-growth dimension, in Panel C. Overall Stewardship, Board Quality, 
Corporate Culture, Manager Incentives, Manager Compensation, Manager Ownership, Regulatory History, and Fees are numeric 
scores of Morningstar stewardship grades. Net expense ratio is the percentage of fund assets paid for operating 
expenses and management fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year return rank percentile (for a 4-year observation 
period) of the fund relative to its peers. Age is the number of months since the date of inception of the fund, and Size 
is the fund’s total asset under management. No of classes is the number of share classes offered by the fund. Turnover 
ratio is the minimum of sales or purchases divided by average monthly net assets. Single manager scores one if fund is 
managed by one manager, and zero otherwise. Management change scores one if there was a total change in managers 
during the observation period (October 2007-September 2011), and zero otherwise. Size objective and Value-Growth 
objective scores one if the fund has a specific style objective in terms of size and value-growth respectively, and zero 
otherwise. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.217 -0.061
(0.555) (0.767)
Board Quality -1.780 0.000 -1.362 -0.075
(0.215) (1.000) (0.122) (0.936)
Corporate Culture 0.194 -0.201 0.199 0.080
(0.771) (0.758) (0.574) (0.809)
Manager Incentives 1.892 ** 1.597 ***
(0.031) (0.004)
Manager Compensation -3.052 * -1.649 *
(0.076) (0.095)
Manager Ownership 5.331 *** 3.456 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Regulatory History -0.070 -4.184 * 1.618 -2.580 ***
(0.982) (0.073) (0.411) (0.006)
Net expense ratio 11.997 *** 10.458 *** 6.699 *** 5.805 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank -0.005 -0.027 -0.018 -0.017 -0.029 -0.026
(0.904) (0.446) (0.612) (0.438) (0.127) (0.184)
Ln(Age) -0.221 -2.543 -1.883 0.410 -0.878 -0.944
(0.925) (0.245) (0.365) (0.742) (0.455) (0.389)
Ln(Size) -4.511 *** -1.815 * -2.359 ** -2.533 *** -1.134 ** -1.321 ***
(0.000) (0.067) (0.012) (0.000) (0.026) (0.006)
No of classes -0.195 * -0.410 *** -0.327 *** -0.108 -0.221 *** -0.150 ***
(0.100) (0.000) (0.003) (0.103) (0.000) (0.010)
Turnover ratio 3.299 *** 3.440 *** 3.550 *** 1.026 ** 1.135 ** 1.187 **
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.029) (0.013) (0.013)
Single manager -1.372 -0.650 -0.773 -0.749 -0.366 -0.246
(0.192) (0.466) (0.366) (0.190) (0.460) (0.607)
Management change -0.431 -0.007 0.529 0.635 0.882 1.208 **
(0.677) (0.994) (0.611) (0.261) (0.109) (0.044)
Size objective -3.607 *** -4.039 *** -3.388 *** -0.911 * -1.089 ** -0.806 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.016) (0.074)
Value-Growth objective -9.421 *** -8.392 *** -8.711 *** -2.765 *** -2.218 *** -2.526 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 90.427 *** 59.003 *** 63.683 *** 46.229 *** 29.633 *** 31.936 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.274 0.396 0.435 0.149 0.314 0.364
Included observations 437 437 418 437 437 418
Panel A: Overall Style Consistency
Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Morningstar SDS
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.272 -0.135
(0.450) (0.480)
Board Quality -1.945 -0.671 -1.124 0.007
(0.197) (0.672) (0.187) (0.994)
Corporate Culture 0.108 -0.141 0.095 -0.016
(0.870) (0.829) (0.784) (0.962)
Manager Incentives 1.805 ** 1.117 **
(0.036) (0.030)
Manager Compensation -2.591 -1.671 *
(0.128) (0.084)
Manager Ownership 4.649 *** 2.659 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Regulatory History 1.087 2.868 * 0.974 0.923
(0.769) (0.065) (0.553) (0.332)
Net expense ratio 11.960 *** 10.743 *** 6.053 *** 5.303 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank -0.048 -0.070 ** -0.061 * -0.028 -0.039 ** -0.037 *
(0.265) (0.044) (0.087) (0.208) (0.033) (0.059)
Ln(Age) -2.457 -4.784 ** -4.082 * -0.357 -1.535 -1.403
(0.296) (0.031) (0.054) (0.743) (0.149) (0.168)
Ln(Size) -3.262 *** -0.613 -1.006 -1.613 *** -0.319 -0.455
(0.001) (0.496) (0.253) (0.001) (0.475) (0.301)
No of classes -0.370 *** -0.582 *** -0.504 *** -0.165 *** -0.268 *** -0.206 ***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001)
Turnover ratio 4.556 *** 4.670 *** 4.710 *** 1.516 *** 1.605 *** 1.651 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Single manager -0.743 -0.038 0.150 -0.096 0.257 0.496
(0.452) (0.966) (0.863) (0.846) (0.590) (0.307)
Management change 1.171 1.566 2.099 ** 0.854 1.069 ** 1.398 ***
(0.281) (0.117) (0.042) (0.122) (0.034) (0.010)
Size objective -3.327 *** -3.752 *** -3.071 *** -1.455 *** -1.651 *** -1.291 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Value-Growth objective -5.889 *** -4.872 *** -4.692 *** -1.780 ** -1.267 * -1.268 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.053) (0.058)
Constant 72.564 *** 41.870 *** 44.396 *** 32.173 *** 16.881 *** 17.809 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.213 0.334 0.364 0.131 0.267 0.301
Included observations 437 437 418 437 437 418
Panel B: Size Consistency
Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Morningstar SDS
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.145 0.098
(0.683) (0.585)
Board Quality -1.527 -0.162 -0.812 -0.223
(0.262) (0.910) (0.270) (0.775)
Corporate Culture 0.186 -0.243 0.354 0.224
(0.766) (0.690) (0.255) (0.451)
Manager Incentives 1.696 ** 1.219 ***
(0.048) (0.007)
Manager Compensation -1.999 -0.747
(0.238) (0.384)
Manager Ownership 4.545 *** 2.537 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Regulatory History 0.747 -5.802 * 1.583 -3.912 ***
(0.818) (0.062) (0.463) (0.000)
Net expense ratio 8.538 *** 7.427 *** 4.246 *** 3.741 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank 0.010 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 -0.010 -0.009
(0.786) (0.874) (0.947) (0.820) (0.553) (0.627)
Ln(Age) 0.035 -1.622 -1.059 0.300 -0.460 -0.588
(0.986) (0.413) (0.587) (0.753) (0.617) (0.503)
Ln(Size) -3.525 *** -1.683 * -2.217 ** -1.810 *** -0.930 * -1.103 **
(0.001) (0.093) (0.022) (0.001) (0.051) (0.017)
No of classes -0.113 -0.261 ** -0.206 ** -0.025 -0.090 * -0.057
(0.284) (0.010) (0.038) (0.652) (0.073) (0.245)
Turnover ratio 1.928 * 2.070 ** 2.079 ** -0.041 0.029 0.046
(0.071) (0.038) (0.047) (0.928) (0.943) (0.911)
Single manager -1.829 * -1.329 -1.644 * -0.906 * -0.646 -0.774
(0.095) (0.187) (0.087) (0.089) (0.187) (0.101)
Management change -0.852 -0.535 -0.217 0.012 0.203 0.367
(0.392) (0.595) (0.840) (0.981) (0.698) (0.509)
Size objective -3.034 *** -3.304 *** -2.881 *** -0.139 -0.236 -0.151
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.768) (0.587) (0.739)
Value-Growth objective -8.078 *** -7.349 *** -7.928 *** -2.075 *** -1.773 *** -2.241 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 72.677 *** 50.844 *** 56.025 *** 32.679 *** 21.993 *** 24.919 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.199 0.275 0.320 0.077 0.179 0.237
Included observations 437 437 418 437 437 418
Panel C: Value Consistency
Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Morningstar SDS
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Contrary to hypothesis H1d, funds with higher managerial ownership 
exhibit lower style consistency and are thus more likely to drift.  Our findings 
show that when fund managers invest a significant amount of money in their 
own fund, they are more likely to deviate from the stated style perhaps in an 
attempt to maximize the return on their own investment. More importantly, the 
fact that both the two components of Manager Incentives have opposite signs 
suggests that combining them into one single measure, as is done in Morningstar 
Stewardship Grade, is inappropriate as their effects are likely to cancel out each 
other and, in our case, result in an overall positive net effect.  
Regulatory History is significant in specifications (3) and (6). Therefore, funds 
with poor regulatory history in the past tend to have a more lax compliance with 
their stated style. In line with hypothesis H2, “good citizen” funds with good 
regulatory history are more likely to manage fundholders’ money responsibly by 
complying with the fund’s investment style. Another important stewardship 
explanatory component is Net Expense Ratio, which has a significantly positive 
coefficient in all specifications. This finding supports hypothesis H3 that funds 
with higher fees relative to their peers exhibit less style consistency. This finding 
suggests that higher fees drive fund managers to be more active in finding 
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investment opportunities that may cause style drift, especially in the face of 
insufficient investment opportunities of the stated investment style.  
Of the control variables, Size, No. Classes, Turnover, Value-Growth Objective, 
and Size Objective are significant. Specifically, larger funds and funds that offer 
more classes of shares are more likely to exhibit style consistency while the 
reverse is found for funds with a high turnover. The level of style consistency is 
significantly related to both style objectives. Therefore, both the size and value-
growth objectives are effective in constraining fund managers’ actual investment 
style within both the size and value-growth dimensions.  
The results are generally intact when we rerun the above regressions for 
style consistency on the size dimension (Panel B) and the value-growth 
dimension (Panel C). The stewardship components that remain significant are 
Manager Ownership and Net expense ratio. Regulatory History is significant in 
explaining style consistency on the value-growth dimension in Panel C, 
consistent with hypothesis H2.  
Using the holding-based measure of style drift as the dependent variable in 
Table 5.4 does not materially change our conclusion although the results are 
more significant, particularly for the Style Consistency Metric (specifications (4) 
to (6)). We find evidence supporting hypothesis H1 that Overall Stewardship is 
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significantly negative in explaining style consistency in the size dimension 
(specification (4) in Panel B). Therefore, funds that have better overall 
stewardship are less likely to exhibit size style drift. Consistent with hypothesis 
H1a, Board Quality is also significant in explaining style consistency in the size 
dimension, which is consistent with hypothesis H1b. 
Net expense ratio is significant across all the panels, as before, suggesting 
greater style consistency in funds that charge lower fees (in line with hypothesis 
H3). Although Regulatory History is significant in explaining consistency in either 
the size (Panel B) or value-growth (Panel C) dimension, it is not if the drift were 
to occur in both dimensions (Panel A). Manager Incentives and Manager Compensation 
are significant in specification (3) of Panel A, with an opposite sign to each other. 
We note that using stewardship components increases the value of the 
adjusted R-squared by about two-fold. This suggests that stewardship component 
measures have a greater explanatory power than the overall stewardship measure 
for the level of style drift. 
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Table 5.4 
OLS regressions of HBSA style consistency on fund stewardship 
Fund actual style is estimated using Holdings-Based Style Analysis (HBSA), and then its consistency is measured 
using Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) Style Drift Score (SDS) and Style Consistency Metric. Funds with lower scores are 
more consistent than those with higher scores. Style consistency is measured either in size dimension, value-growth 
dimension, or combination of both. Results for the style consistency measure for both size and value-growth 
dimensions, are in Panel A; the style consistency measure for the size dimension, in Panel B; and the style consistency 
measure for the value-growth dimension, in Panel C. Overall Stewardship, Board Quality, Corporate Culture, Manager 
Incentives, Manager Compensation, Manager Ownership, Regulatory History, and Fees are numeric scores of Morningstar 
stewardship grades. Net expense ratio is the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management 
fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year return rank percentile (for a 4-year observation period) of the fund relative 
to its peers. Age is the number of months since the date of inception of the fund, and Size is the fund’s total asset 
under management. No of classes is the number of share classes offered by the fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of 
sales or purchases divided by average monthly net assets. Single manager scores one if fund is managed by one 
manager, and zero otherwise. Management change scores one if there was a total change in managers during the 
observation period (October 2007-September 2011), and zero otherwise. Size objective and Value-Growth objective scores 
one if the fund has a specific style objective in terms of size and value-growth respectively, and zero otherwise. p-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.002 0.419
(0.991) (0.299)
Board Quality 0.366 0.755 0.683 0.832
(0.556) (0.283) (0.584) (0.534)
Corporate Culture 0.341 0.212 1.630 ** 1.353 *
(0.162) (0.396) (0.018) (0.050)
Manager Incentives -0.107 -0.457
(0.737) (0.545)
Manager Compensation -1.233 * -1.245
(0.096) (0.397)
Manager Ownership 0.753 * 0.522
(0.062) (0.628)
Regulatory History -0.889 -1.076 -0.867 -2.797
(0.321) (0.171) (0.760) (0.439)
Net expense ratio 3.991 *** 3.662 *** 8.384 *** 7.967 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank -0.022 -0.029 * -0.028 * 0.004 -0.008 -0.008
(0.189) (0.062) (0.077) (0.913) (0.831) (0.835)
Ln(Age) 0.408 -0.274 -0.083 -2.678 -3.927 * -3.949 *
(0.612) (0.728) (0.916) (0.243) (0.083) (0.097)
Ln(Size) -1.815 *** -0.850 ** -0.992 ** -2.809 ** -0.667 -0.953
(0.000) (0.038) (0.017) (0.021) (0.594) (0.465)
No of classes -0.171 *** -0.235 *** -0.221 *** -0.433 *** -0.529 *** -0.525 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover ratio 1.727 *** 1.740 *** 1.797 *** 6.096 *** 6.093 *** 6.257 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Single manager -1.140 *** -0.776 ** -0.842 ** -1.142 -0.353 -0.630
(0.002) (0.026) (0.023) (0.249) (0.698) (0.504)
Management change 0.150 0.392 0.562 1.564 2.201 * 2.459 **
(0.725) (0.327) (0.202) (0.210) (0.071) (0.047)
Size objective -1.438 *** -1.678 *** -1.532 *** -1.726 -2.303 ** -2.285 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.026) (0.036)
Value-Growth objective -3.078 *** -2.787 *** -2.838 *** -4.616 *** -4.103 *** -4.387 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 30.356 *** 18.161 *** 19.416 *** 49.109 *** 22.382 ** 26.514 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.014)
Adjusted R-squared 0.293 0.364 0.374 0.222 0.273 0.281
Included observations 447 447 424 447 447 424
Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Style Consistency Metric
Panel A: Overall Style Consistency
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.347 ** -0.674 ***
(0.024) (0.001)
Board Quality -0.360 -0.544 -1.670 * -1.737 *
(0.536) (0.425) (0.057) (0.059)
Corporate Culture -0.046 -0.117 -0.562 -0.558
(0.855) (0.656) (0.150) (0.164)
Manager Incentives -0.163 0.223
(0.625) (0.667)
Manager Compensation 0.085 0.643
(0.900) (0.468)
Manager Ownership -0.092 -0.023
(0.838) (0.975)
Regulatory History -0.461 -0.754 -0.435 -3.067 *
(0.562) (0.332) (0.810) (0.060)
Net expense ratio 4.377 *** 4.326 *** 3.726 *** 3.945 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank -0.050 *** -0.059 *** -0.053 *** -0.030 -0.040 * -0.032
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.183) (0.061) (0.161)
Ln(Age) -0.957 -1.858 ** -1.966 ** -0.812 -1.841 -2.082 *
(0.258) (0.027) (0.025) (0.500) (0.134) (0.097)
Ln(Size) -1.104 ** -0.162 -0.218 -1.130 ** -0.464 -0.414
(0.015) (0.721) (0.644) (0.045) (0.447) (0.504)
No of classes -0.132 *** -0.200 *** -0.207 *** -0.248 *** -0.305 *** -0.307 ***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turnover ratio 2.112 *** 2.196 *** 2.055 *** 3.331 *** 3.516 *** 3.273 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Single manager -0.095 0.219 0.164 -0.119 -0.027 -0.026
(0.810) (0.579) (0.689) (0.852) (0.968) (0.970)
Management change 0.800 * 1.027 ** 1.011 ** 0.892 1.041 1.037
(0.084) (0.019) (0.028) (0.219) (0.143) (0.175)
Size objective -0.131 -0.385 -0.485 -2.839 *** -3.007 *** -3.274 ***
(0.758) (0.324) (0.229) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Value-Growth objective -1.868 *** -1.450 *** -1.552 *** -2.394 *** -1.871 *** -2.049 ***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006)
Constant 25.128 *** 13.150 *** 14.254 *** 30.412 *** 22.505 *** 22.277 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.229 0.304 0.295 0.254 0.278 0.269
Included observations 447 447 424 447 447 424
Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Style Consistency Metric
Panel B: Size Consistency
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship 0.137 0.260
(0.377) (0.555)
Board Quality 0.716 1.168 -1.575 -1.458
(0.269) (0.115) (0.374) (0.461)
Corporate Culture 0.431 0.319 1.640 ** 1.333
(0.131) (0.274) (0.046) (0.113)
Manager Incentives -0.192 -0.979
(0.593) (0.313)
Manager Compensation -1.337 -1.597
(0.111) (0.382)
Manager Ownership 0.652 0.182
(0.137) (0.894)
Regulatory History -2.169 * -1.732 * -0.727 -1.007
(0.081) (0.086) (0.806) (0.829)
Net expense ratio 3.111 *** 2.751 *** 5.786 *** 5.450 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.017)
Return rank 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.085 * 0.076 0.067
(0.877) (0.894) (0.856) (0.077) (0.108) (0.170)
Ln(Age) 0.345 -0.134 0.110 -2.500 -3.479 -2.826
(0.700) (0.880) (0.903) (0.325) (0.181) (0.315)
Ln(Size) -1.730 *** -0.884 ** -1.011 ** -2.512 * -0.962 -1.337
(0.000) (0.047) (0.025) (0.064) (0.525) (0.401)
No of classes -0.162 *** -0.216 *** -0.201 *** -0.409 *** -0.415 *** -0.424 ***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Turnover ratio 1.729 *** 1.716 *** 1.832 *** 6.022 *** 6.080 *** 6.410 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Single manager -1.068 ** -0.745 * -0.799 * -0.944 -0.626 -0.930
(0.015) (0.073) (0.067) (0.462) (0.608) (0.462)
Management change -0.093 0.123 0.313 2.625 * 3.189 ** 3.502 **
(0.850) (0.798) (0.545) (0.091) (0.046) (0.041)
Size objective -2.158 *** -2.374 *** -2.151 *** -5.981 *** -6.522 *** -6.248 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Value-Growth objective -3.374 *** -3.159 *** -3.106 *** -7.818 *** -7.306 *** -7.187 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 27.355 *** 16.831 *** 17.665 *** 52.392 *** 35.173 *** 38.267 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003)
Adjusted R-squared 0.271 0.307 0.305 0.239 0.254 0.249
Included observations 447 447 424 447 447 424
Style Consistency MetricIdzorek & Bertsch SDS
Panel C: Value Consistency
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Table 5.5 reports the results for an alternative measure of style consistency, 
which is style dispersion. We look at the overall style dispersion, style dispersion 
in the size dimension, and style dispersion in the value-growth dimension. 
Results show that Overall Stewardship is significant only for size style dispersion 
(specification (4)). Therefore, funds with high overall stewardship have lower 
style dispersion in the size dimension. 
Board Quality has a significantly negative coefficient in almost all the 
specifications, suggesting that funds with higher board quality are more 
constrained in their style and thus exhibit lower style dispersion. There is 
evidence that Corporate Culture also does well in constraining fund style dispersion 
(specifications (5) and (6)). 
The remaining results are mostly consistent with those reported earlier for 
the various style consistency measures. The size dispersion regressions have by 
far the highest goodness of fit, suggesting that the set of explanatory variables 
that we test perform best in explaining style dispersion in the size dimension. 
Despite the negative association between style drift and fund stewardship 
(except for managerial ownership), we should be aware of potential endogeneity 
problems that might affect the causal interpretation. It is possible, for example, 
that    funds   strive   to   improve    their   style   consistency   and    stewardship 
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Table 5.5 
OLS regressions of style dispersion on fund stewardship 
Style dispersion measures the average degree of scatter of the holdings during the observation period (October 2007-
September 2011). Funds with lower scores have less scattered stock holdings than those with higher scores. Style 
dispersion is measured either along size dimension, value-growth dimension, or combination of both. Overall 
Stewardship, Board Quality, Corporate Culture, Manager Incentives, Manager Compensation, Manager Ownership, Regulatory History, 
and Fees are numeric scores of Morningstar stewardship grades. Net expense ratio is the percentage of fund assets paid 
for operating expenses and management fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year return rank percentile (for a 4-
year observation period) of the fund relative to its peers. Age is the number of months since the date of inception of 
the fund, and Size is the fund’s total asset under management. No of classes is the number of share classes offered by 
the fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of sales or purchases divided by average monthly net assets. Single manager 
scores one if fund is managed by one manager, and zero otherwise. Management change scores one if there was a total 
change in managers during the observation period (October 2007-September 2011), and zero otherwise. Size objective 
and Value-Growth objective scores one if the fund has a specific style objective in terms of size and value-growth 
respectively, and zero otherwise. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Overall Stewardship -1.134 -2.045 *** -0.149
(0.149) (0.002) (0.819)
Board Quality -9.181 *** -11.056 *** -8.422 *** -9.282 *** -5.984 *** -7.637 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Corporate Culture -1.882 -1.541 -2.819 ** -2.614 ** -0.655 -0.353
(0.145) (0.252) (0.014) (0.026) (0.525) (0.743)
Manager Incentives 1.715 0.838 1.660
(0.329) (0.605) (0.264)
Manager Compensation 6.512 ** 2.868 5.926 **
(0.036) (0.304) (0.029)
Manager Ownership -1.141 -0.496 -0.847
(0.637) (0.819) (0.659)
Regulatory History 9.214 * 6.819 7.596 ** 6.317 ** 6.104 4.189
(0.057) (0.308) (0.025) (0.041) (0.124) (0.527)
Net expense ratio -6.430 * -4.817 -4.648 -3.663 -4.820 -3.510
(0.078) (0.207) (0.157) (0.282) (0.116) (0.268)
Return rank 0.067 0.069 0.041 -0.089 -0.093 -0.126 * 0.132 *** 0.136 *** 0.122 **
(0.272) (0.271) (0.545) (0.175) (0.183) (0.094) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024)
Ln(Age) -10.414 *** -9.993 *** -9.766 *** -11.017 *** -11.144 *** -11.352 *** -4.938 * -4.403 -3.971
(0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.081) (0.130) (0.187)
Ln(Size) 5.690 *** 3.751 ** 3.762 ** 5.174 *** 3.389 ** 3.351 ** 3.587 *** 2.350 * 2.397 *
(0.000) (0.016) (0.017) (0.000) (0.014) (0.016) (0.003) (0.097) (0.093)
No of classes -0.322 -0.197 -0.280 -0.234 -0.149 -0.193 -0.196 -0.104 -0.172
(0.134) (0.336) (0.183) (0.289) (0.495) (0.384) (0.258) (0.535) (0.335)
Turnover ratio 2.457 2.892 * 2.811 5.498 *** 6.153 *** 6.491 *** -0.652 -0.525 -0.864
(0.184) (0.096) (0.132) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.708) (0.753) (0.633)
Single manager 0.191 -1.481 -1.779 -0.710 -2.065 -2.040 0.602 -0.586 -0.946
(0.925) (0.464) (0.392) (0.688) (0.255) (0.273) (0.740) (0.745) (0.609)
Management change 3.964 ** 3.572 * 3.159 0.948 0.563 0.371 4.329 ** 4.071 ** 3.705 **
(0.045) (0.054) (0.113) (0.591) (0.743) (0.839) (0.013) (0.015) (0.034)
Size objective -17.593 *** -16.704 *** -17.573 *** -24.031 *** -23.427 *** -24.482 *** -6.384 *** -5.677 *** -6.060 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Value-Growth objective -0.251 0.522 0.282 0.147 0.869 0.468 0.323 0.828 0.836
(0.902) (0.798) (0.896) (0.944) (0.659) (0.822) (0.867) (0.676) (0.696)
Constant 128.177 *** 158.818 *** 158.612 *** 75.139 *** 100.802 *** 102.742 *** 100.940 *** 122.276 *** 120.580 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.246 0.269 0.263 0.389 0.398 0.401 0.084 0.100 0.091
Included observations 395 395 378 395 395 378 395 395 378
Overall Dispersion Size Dispersion Value Dispersion 
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concurrently during the observation period because of common factors such as 
regulatory requirement or competitive necessity. Another potential concern is 
reverse causality where funds aim to improve their stewardship entirely following 
their successful effort to increase components of stewardship which are 
particularly related to fund monitoring such as Board Quality. However, this 
reverse causality is asymmetrical as it is unlikely that low style consistency leads 
to poorer fund governance as a whole.  
5.4 Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate specifications (4) to (6) of 
RBSA style consistency (Table 5.3) using split sample based on fund objectives, 
i.e. whether a fund has objective in Size or Value-Growth dimension. The results 
are presented in Table 5.6, where specifications (1) to (3) report the results for 
subsample with Size Objective, and specifications (4) to (6) for subsample with 
the Value-Growth Objective. 
 Consistent with our previous results, in any dimension of style consistency 
(Panels A to C), the signs and significance of Manager Ownership and Manager 
Compensation are maintained in both subsamples (specifications (3) and (6)), where 
Manager Ownership has a significantly positive coefficient and Manager Compensation 
has a significantly negative one (except for Value Consistency where both sample   
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Table 5.6 
Sub-sample analyses of style consistency 
This table reports the regression results of style consistency on fund stewardship variables for two sub-samples, i.e. 
funds with size objective (column 1-3) and funds with value-growth objective (column 4-6). Fund actual style is 
estimated using Return-Based Style Analysis (RBSA), and then its consistency is measured using Morningstar Style 
Drift Score (SDS) method. Funds with lower SDS are more consistent than those with higher scores. SDS is 
measured either in size dimension, value-growth dimension, or combination of both. Results for Overall SDS are in 
Panel A; Size SDS in Panel B; and Value SDS in Panel C. Overall Stewardship, Board Quality, Corporate Culture, Manager 
Incentives, Manager Compensation, Manager Ownership, and Regulatory History are numeric scores of Morningstar 
stewardship grades. Net expense ratio is the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management 
fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year return rank percentile (for a 4-year observation period) of the fund relative 
to its peers. Age is the number of months since the date of inception of the fund, and Size is the fund’s total asset 
under management. No of classes is the number of share classes offered by the fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of 
sales or purchases divided by average monthly net assets. Single manager scores one if fund is managed by one 
manager, and zero otherwise. Management change scores one if there was a total change in managers during the 
observation period (October 2007-September 2011), and zero otherwise. Size objective and Value-Growth objective scores 
one if the fund has a specific style objective in terms of size and value-growth respectively, and zero otherwise. p-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.586 * -0.140
(0.051) (0.518)
Board Quality -2.441 ** -0.674 -0.774 0.582
(0.017) (0.524) (0.390) (0.551)
Corporate Culture 0.103 -0.423 0.260 -0.023
(0.854) (0.457) (0.481) (0.949)
Manager Incentives 0.967 1.558 **
(0.301) (0.011)
Manager Compensation -3.216 *** -2.540 **
(0.005) (0.011)
Manager Ownership 2.979 *** 3.496 ***
(0.003) (0.000)
Regulatory History 1.394 -1.473 0.926 -2.536 **
(0.364) (0.162) (0.629) (0.027)
Net expense ratio 7.434 *** 6.175 *** 6.873 *** 5.891 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank -0.024 -0.045 -0.052 -0.005 -0.019 -0.019
(0.503) (0.192) (0.188) (0.819) (0.337) (0.362)
Ln(Age) 0.053 -1.346 -1.510 0.169 -1.131 -1.117
(0.979) (0.511) (0.453) (0.893) (0.353) (0.305)
Ln(Size) -2.271 ** -0.775 -1.343 -2.102 *** -0.664 -0.903 *
(0.014) (0.432) (0.152) (0.002) (0.267) (0.095)
No of classes 0.023 -0.030 0.047 -0.045 -0.165 *** -0.111 **
(0.852) (0.782) (0.667) (0.508) (0.005) (0.047)
Turnover ratio -0.610 -0.392 -0.980 0.779 0.838 0.968
(0.506) (0.630) (0.249) (0.211) (0.158) (0.105)
Single manager -1.345 -0.873 -0.664 -0.762 -0.526 -0.422
(0.186) (0.335) (0.437) (0.226) (0.338) (0.437)
Management change -0.458 0.225 -0.018 -0.059 0.180 0.348
(0.651) (0.808) (0.987) (0.926) (0.777) (0.604)
Size objective -4.696 *** -2.633 *** -2.796 ***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.003)
Value-Growth objective -1.457 ** -1.227 ** -0.856 *
(0.012) (0.019) (0.088)
Constant 49.751 *** 29.966 *** 37.775 *** 40.173 *** 23.344 *** 25.699 ***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.364 0.427 0.079 0.287 0.354
Included observations 143 143 134 331 331 320
Size Objective Value-Growth Objective
Panel A: Overall Style Consistency (Morningstar SDS)
75 
 
Table 5.6 (Continued) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.838 *** -0.202
(0.002) (0.298)
Board Quality -3.543 *** -2.321 ** -0.925 0.162
(0.000) (0.022) (0.287) (0.859)
Corporate Culture 0.376 0.007 0.092 -0.129
(0.496) (0.991) (0.781) (0.688)
Manager Incentives 0.428 1.095 **
(0.618) (0.038)
Manager Compensation -3.065 *** -2.415 ***
(0.004) (0.006)
Manager Ownership 1.862 ** 2.668 ***
(0.045) (0.000)
Regulatory History 1.449 1.658 * 1.798 0.908
(0.235) (0.059) (0.105) (0.147)
Net expense ratio 6.184 *** 5.326 *** 5.696 *** 4.902 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank -0.057 * -0.073 ** -0.073 ** -0.008 -0.020 -0.017
(0.079) (0.015) (0.041) (0.737) (0.279) (0.381)
Ln(Age) 1.077 -0.040 0.051 -0.240 -1.345 -1.286
(0.468) (0.979) (0.973) (0.823) (0.214) (0.195)
Ln(Size) -0.632 0.588 0.291 -1.298 ** -0.127 -0.271
(0.392) (0.488) (0.729) (0.013) (0.792) (0.550)
No of classes -0.032 0.000 0.060 -0.099 * -0.197 *** -0.151 ***
(0.766) (0.996) (0.621) (0.088) (0.001) (0.007)
Turnover ratio 0.683 1.186 * 0.553 0.988 * 1.024 * 1.050 **
(0.375) (0.074) (0.452) (0.068) (0.052) (0.048)
Single manager -0.630 -0.473 -0.294 -0.179 -0.026 0.084
(0.454) (0.553) (0.705) (0.725) (0.958) (0.867)
Management change -0.858 0.015 -0.146 0.032 0.226 0.385
(0.338) (0.985) (0.872) (0.951) (0.652) (0.458)
Size objective -1.898 * 0.035 -0.038
(0.076) (0.969) (0.965)
Value-Growth objective -1.418 *** -1.233 *** -0.922 **
(0.004) (0.007) (0.031)
Constant 24.960 *** 6.814 11.307 26.861 *** 13.491 *** 14.959 ***
(0.001) (0.450) (0.215) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002)
Adjusted R-squared 0.088 0.279 0.328 0.070 0.257 0.315
Included observations 143 143 134 331 331 320
Size Objective Value-Growth Objective
Panel B: Size Consistency (Morningstar SDS)
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Table 5.6 (Continued) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Stewardship -0.221 0.096
(0.417) (0.596)
Board Quality -1.434 -0.449 -0.185 0.678
(0.163) (0.701) (0.814) (0.436)
Corporate Culture -0.001 -0.417 0.534 0.312
(0.998) (0.448) (0.104) (0.331)
Manager Incentives 1.446 * 1.362 ***
(0.086) (0.010)
Manager Compensation -1.202 -1.266
(0.321) (0.166)
Manager Ownership 2.694 *** 2.728 ***
(0.006) (0.000)
Regulatory History 0.690 -1.719 -0.294 -3.541 ***
(0.665) (0.115) (0.880) (0.000)
Net expense ratio 4.934 *** 4.199 *** 4.668 *** 3.966 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank 0.013 -0.005 -0.015 0.008 0.001 -0.001
(0.703) (0.888) (0.692) (0.679) (0.958) (0.958)
Ln(Age) -0.816 -1.752 -1.917 0.286 -0.524 -0.541
(0.658) (0.353) (0.326) (0.781) (0.602) (0.561)
Ln(Size) -1.785 ** -0.813 -1.129 -1.757 *** -0.741 -0.922 *
(0.025) (0.338) (0.191) (0.002) (0.154) (0.059)
No of classes 0.006 -0.057 -0.024 -0.003 -0.078 -0.049
(0.957) (0.566) (0.812) (0.956) (0.104) (0.315)
Turnover ratio -1.702 * -1.654 ** -1.808 ** 0.073 0.136 0.334
(0.054) (0.042) (0.032) (0.888) (0.779) (0.479)
Single manager -1.614 * -1.275 -1.188 -0.946 * -0.747 -0.703
(0.076) (0.145) (0.173) (0.095) (0.142) (0.163)
Management change -0.055 0.311 0.236 -0.327 -0.114 -0.017
(0.950) (0.730) (0.821) (0.551) (0.842) (0.977)
Size objective -4.343 *** -2.866 *** -2.923 ***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
Value-Growth objective -0.873 -0.681 -0.375
(0.104) (0.182) (0.465)
Constant 39.060 *** 27.294 *** 31.950 *** 29.720 *** 17.227 *** 18.971 ***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.158 0.281 0.298 0.052 0.194 0.238
Included observations 143 143 134 331 331 320
Size Objective Value-Growth Objective
Panel C: Value Consistency (Morningstar SDS)
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and subsamples give insignificant coefficients). However, the significance of 
Manager Incentives (specifications (2) and (5)) is hold for both subsamples only in 
Value Consistency (Panel C), as it turns out to be insignificant for subsample 
with Size Objective in the overall and size dimensions. This is also the case for 
Regulatory History whose significant negative coefficient is only maintained in 
Value-Growth subsample. One explanation for this is the number of 
observations of Size Objective subsample which is relatively smaller than the 
Value-Growth counterpart. 
5.5 Additional Tests 
In this section we report additional tests using principal component analysis 
(PCA). PCA has been used in corporate governance literature to identify a small 
number of underlying factors (dimensions) of corporate governance (Ammann, 
Oesch, and Schmid, 2011; Chen and Chen, 2012; Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 
2007). Applying PCA to the stewardship components, we obtain five dimensions 
of stewardship that explain all variance in the original stewardship grades. Table 
5.7 reports the results of PCA, which we restrict to factor loadings in excess of 
0.1 in absolute terms. 
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Table 5.7 
Factor analysis of fund stewardship 
Factor analysis is carried out on the components and subcomponents of Morningstar Stewardship Grades, i.e. Board 
Quality, Corporate Culture, Manager Compensation, Manager Ownership, and Regulatory History. Loadings are obtained using 
principal factor method. Factor loadings less than |0.1| are set to blank. 
 
 
 The first factor indicates the overall quality of fund stewardship since it has 
positive loadings on all stewardship components and strong correlation with 
Morningstar Overall Stewardship Grade (r=0.83). For that reason, we name this 
factor as General Stewardship (to make a distinction to Morningstar ‘Overall 
Stewardship’). The second factor shows positive loadings for Corporate Culture, 
Manager Ownership, and Regulatory History, and negative loadings for Board Quality 
and Manager Compensation. As such, the factor seems to capture Investment 
Venture versus Investment Monitoring of fund managers and board. Since this 
thesis focus on the monitoring role of fund stewardship, we name the second 
factor as Investment Monitoring (instead of Investment Venture) and alter the factor 
score signs from negative to positive and vice versa. Following Gutmann (1954) 
and Kaiser (1960, 1961), we do not take into account factors with eigenvalues 
Eigenvalue 1.637 1.150 0.938 0.730 0.545
Percentage explained 0.327 0.230 0.188 0.146 0.109
Board Quality 0.578 -0.381 -0.715
Corporate Culture 0.487 0.392 -0.123 -0.724 0.265
Manager Compensation 0.531 -0.452 0.351 0.623
Manager Ownership 0.296 0.586 -0.499 0.538 -0.174
Regulatory History 0.244 0.391 0.855 0.238
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
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below one. Thus, we focus on the first two factors of stewardship, which explain 
55.7 percent of the total variance in the stewardship grades. 
 Next, we examine the relation between style consistency (based on RBSA 
and style dispersion) and stewardship factors. Style drift is measured using the 
methods in Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) and Morningstar, style dispersion is 
measured using Morningstar Style Dispersion Metric, while stewardship factors 
consist of General Stewardship and Investment Monitoring. We run regressions of the 
drift measures on those two factors, and report the results in Tables 5.8. 
 Consistent with our previous findings, General Stewardship has significant 
negative association with style dispersion especially in size dimension. While we 
do not find significant relationship between overall dispersion and Overall 
Stewardship in previous test, here we find significant negative relationship between 
those variables. These results indicate that fund stewardship in general concerns 
more in monitoring the scatter of the portfolio holdings within the period, 
especially in size dimension. However, there is no evidence that the monitoring 
role of stewardship matters in controlling holdings dispersion. 
 For more elaborate tasks such as style drift monitoring, Investment Monitoring 
has a significant negative coefficient in all dimensions regardless the drift 
measure used. On the contrary, General Stewardship  is  not  found  affecting  drift, 
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Table 5.8 
OLS regressions of style consistency/dispersion on stewardship factors 
This table reports the regression results of style consistency and style dispersion on the first two factors. Fund actual 
style is estimated using Return-Based Style Analysis (RBSA), and then its consistency is measured using Style Drift 
Score (SDS) method in Idzorek and Bertsch (2004) and Morningstar. Funds with lower SDS are more consistent than 
those with higher scores. Style Dispersion Metric measures the average degree of scatter of the holdings during the 
observation period (October 2007-September 2011). Funds with lower scores have less scattered stock holdings than 
those with higher scores. SDS and Style Dispersion Metric are measured either in size dimension (Size), value-growth 
dimension (Value), or combination of both (Overall). Net expense ratio is the percentage of fund assets paid for 
operating expenses and management fees. Return rank is the average of mid-year return rank percentile (for a 4-year 
observation period) of the fund relative to its peers. Age is the number of months since the date of inception of the 
fund, and Size is the fund’s total asset under management. No of classes is the number of share classes offered by the 
fund. Turnover ratio is the minimum of sales or purchases divided by average monthly net assets. Single manager scores 
one if fund is managed by one manager, and zero otherwise. Management change scores one if there was a total change 
in managers during the observation period (October 2007-September 2011), and zero otherwise. Size objective and 
Value-Growth objective scores one if the fund has a specific style objective in terms of size and value-growth 
respectively, and zero otherwise. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
 
which is consistent with our previous  results  based  on  return-based  approach. 
These findings suggest that fund stewardship has a significant role in investment 
monitoring especially in the continuous monitoring of style drift over periods. In 
sum, our results provide evidence that funds stewardship matters to style 
monitoring, both in the monitoring of holdings dispersion and style consistency.   
Factor 1: General Stewardship -1.747 ** -2.345 *** -0.706 -0.041 0.035 -0.056 0.100 0.071 0.128
(0.048) (0.002) (0.317) (0.919) (0.924) (0.892) (0.668) (0.722) (0.528)
Factor 2: Investment Monitoring 0.182 0.067 0.135 -1.523 *** -1.688 *** -1.114 ** -1.018 *** -0.935 *** -0.664 **
(0.833) (0.925) (0.854) (0.002) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012)
Net expense ratio -4.002 -2.366 -3.212 12.200 *** 12.085 *** 9.046 *** 6.849 *** 6.044 *** 4.507 ***
(0.264) (0.461) (0.283) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return rank 0.044 -0.120 0.123 ** -0.018 -0.059 * 0.003 -0.026 -0.036 * -0.010
(0.498) (0.106) (0.021) (0.610) (0.092) (0.943) (0.172) (0.065) (0.578)
Ln(Age) -9.801 *** -11.481 *** -3.935 -1.859 -4.098 * -1.009 -0.912 -1.416 -0.527
(0.007) (0.001) (0.191) (0.387) (0.058) (0.610) (0.425) (0.176) (0.561)
Ln(Size) 4.365 *** 3.992 *** 2.761 * -1.876 ** -0.627 -1.744 * -1.022 ** -0.259 -0.865 *
(0.006) (0.006) (0.052) (0.037) (0.472) (0.063) (0.030) (0.571) (0.055)
No of classes -0.193 -0.086 -0.129 -0.327 *** -0.485 *** -0.210 ** -0.155 ** -0.200 *** -0.071
(0.357) (0.692) (0.463) (0.003) (0.000) (0.037) (0.011) (0.002) (0.153)
Turnover ratio 2.665 6.605 *** -1.104 3.254 *** 4.625 *** 1.761 * 0.967 ** 1.582 *** -0.204
(0.154) (0.000) (0.547) (0.001) (0.000) (0.092) (0.045) (0.001) (0.654)
Single manager -0.739 -1.235 -0.187 -0.768 0.197 -1.593 * -0.231 0.486 -0.735
(0.722) (0.500) (0.918) (0.370) (0.817) (0.099) (0.625) (0.291) (0.116)
Management change 3.769 * 1.130 3.996 ** 0.388 2.160 ** -0.363 1.088 * 1.389 *** 0.205
(0.059) (0.530) (0.023) (0.699) (0.028) (0.720) (0.051) (0.007) (0.687)
Size objective -0.483 -0.022 0.231 -8.523 *** -4.549 *** -7.789 *** -2.428 *** -1.172 * -2.200 ***
(0.824) (0.992) (0.912) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.000)
Value-Growth objective -17.770 *** -24.913 *** -6.069 *** -3.881 *** -3.477 *** -3.318 *** -1.087 ** -1.517 *** -0.329
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.448)
Constant 136.034 *** 76.245 *** 108.884 *** 57.217 *** 38.204 *** 49.859 *** 28.726 *** 15.165 *** 23.062 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.242 0.390 0.074 0.417 0.358 0.303 0.336 0.290 0.211
Included observations 378 378 378 418 418 418 418 418 418
Style Dispersion Metric
Overall Size Value
Idzorek & Bertsch SDS Morningstar SDS
Overall Size Value Overall Size Value
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 CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between fund stewardship quality and 
style drift for a sample of 464 U.S. mutual fund companies. Although there is 
only weak evidence showing a negative association between overall fund 
stewardship and style drift, the results are more convincing for the individual 
stewardship component measures. In most specifications, we find Net expense 
ratio, Regulatory History, and the subcomponents of Manager Incentives, i.e., Manager 
Compensation and Manager Ownership are significant in explaining fund drift. We 
also provide evidence that Board Quality and Corporate Culture are significant in 
explaining style drift particularly in the size dimension. The results are robust 
irrespective of how we measure style drift – style consistency or style dispersion. 
Therefore, in this thesis we are able to provide the first solid evidence that better 
fund stewardship can better ensure that the fund board undertakes its fiduciary 
duties, including increased monitoring of the fund investment style.   
Our results have two important implications for research using MS Grade. 
First, the individual stewardship components have greater explanatory power 
than the overall stewardship score, at least in explaining style drift. This implies 
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that the individual components should be used in future tests of fund 
stewardship. The second implication is that the two components of Manager 
Incentives (i.e. Manager Compensation and Manager Ownership) are distinct and have 
different effects on style drift. Therefore, combining them into a single measure, 
as is done by MS Grade, is not appropriate. These components should therefore 
be treated separately in empirical tests. 
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Appendix A 
Approaches, techniques, and measurement methods for style consistency 
 
Style 
Consistency 
Measure 
Style 
Consistency 
Measure 
Method 
Style 
Exposure Technique Approach 
Research 
Focus 
Investment Style 
Consistency 
Return-based 
(RBSA) 
Quadratic 
programming 
Inferred style 
exposure 
Total inter-period 
distances Morningstar SDS 
Average distance 
from center 
Idzorek & 
Bertsch’s SDS 
Holding-based 
(HBSA) 
Morningstar style 
box 
Actual style 
exposure 
VG score & Size 
score 
Position 
dispersion in style 
box 
Morningstar Style 
Consistency 
Metric  
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Appendix B 
Morningstar stewardship measures 
 
 
  
Numerical 
Measures 
Sub 
Component 
Component Overall 
Overall 
Stewardship 
Grade 
Board Quality Board Quality BQ Score 
Corporate 
Culture 
Corporate 
Culture CC Score 
Manager 
Incentives 
Manager 
Compensation MC Score 
Manager  
Ownership  MO Score 
Regulatory 
History 
Regulatory 
History RH Score 
Fees Grade Fees Grade 
F Score 
Net Expense 
Ratio 
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